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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation

Complying with the New Maritime Security Regime:
Towards a Model Law Enforcement Approach

Degree

MSc
The objective of this study is to bring about the fact that the shipping which

required a great deal of attention for safety and environmental issues through actions
from IMO and member states, now has to deal with the new issues related to
maritime security for providing safe and secure maritime environment for betterment
of trade and the world commerce. The recent security incidents and the events of
9/11 has changed the industry view about maritime security where maritime systems
and infrastructure can be used as both targets and as weapons or as conduit for
perpetrators of maritime crimes. While the aviation sector has tightened the security,
the maritime sector has been lagging behind due to various reasons and has become
most vulnerable. The IMO has periodically dealt with the security issues and adopted
various conventions and resolutions, but the maritime security regime adopted by the
member states varied from high priority national security agenda to a low level
administrative issue in some other states. The recent amendments to SOLAS 74 and
adoption of ISPS Code have brought about new awareness in the shipping sector. It
has made the ships and ports to be more secure than before and brought about some
level of commitment from the crew and the port officials. But the level of
involvement of private players and the late rush to put in the mandatory security
measures has turned it into a procedural exercise which in most cases involved
measures that did not form part of sound maritime security strategies under the
national or regional security policies.
But security is a serious issue and it is an ongoing and continuous process. This
dissertation is intended to confirm the ground realities of the maritime security as
prevalent today. Towards this objective, a questionnaire was sent to few selected
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states especially emerging maritime nations spread all across the world to check their
maritime security regimes and its efficacy to address the new security issues.
The existing maritime security legal regimes has been analysed and establishes that
ISPS Code and SUA 1988 convention are adequately sound instruments but in terms
of maritime security they vary between preventive security measures and punitive
security measures respectively. However those two measures cannot provide total
security unless the measures for protective and response security measures are also
addressed together in a coordinated manner. It is found that the preventive part has
been addressed well by the industry but the reactive part of the security, which needs
action by the governments, has been left for the states to do the needful and it differs
widely due to politico-socio-economic conditions.
In the absence of framework instrument emanated from international organisation,
the existing legal regime for maritime security has not helped the states to integrate
the security measures collectively and addressing them through sound security
policies, strategies and contingency plans.
Certain proposals are made for establishing maritime security policies and strategy
for the developing countries and also recommendations for the IMO for developing a
framework convention in the same mould of the OPRC 90 for maritime security
preparedness, response and cooperation and issues for global governance of maritime
terrorism.

KEY WORDS : MARITIME SECURITY, SUA CONVENTION, ISPS CODE,
PREVENTIVE SECURITY, SECURITY ENFORCEMENT
STRATEGY, PIRACY, MARITIME TERRRORISM
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

The Threat to Shipping Today: How Serious is It?

Shipping is the embodiment of the free enterprise and entrepreneurial zeal that
characterise the ebb and flow of modern global capital and is perhaps the most
independent of economic activities undertaken on earth. Many of these ventures are
without allegiances of any kind, swapping identities and nationalities at will and
protected by registries, which in this age of info-commerce can be shopped through
the Internet. Shipping is a free enterprise and at its freest, measures and strategies to
exploit even marginal opportunities are taken to the extreme. A ship, legally
speaking, is much like a floating embassy, an extension of the state whose flag it
flies, with seamen aboard the ship subject to the same laws that govern their shorebased counterparts. It is also unsettling to be appraised of the fact that the laws,
treaties, conventions, traditions, and organizations which, were meant to regulate the
sea and the social, economic, ecological impacts emanating from it, have been
exploited by ingenious individuals and corporate bodies of various nationalities. To
aid and abet such nefarious intents, there is a prevailing culture in many jurisdictions,
which tolerates convenience at the expense of strict legality. Ownership structures
exist to diffuse responsibility and risk; illegal crew with dubious identity still man
many vessels. The volatility of the insurance market has created a culture of under or
non-reporting of security incidents and the very small profit margins of the industry
are often used as an excuse to avoid adherence to the norms that are painstakingly
made by the IMO and the Industry.

The maritime transport industry is the most economical means of transporting goods
with ninety percent (90%) of the world annual trade by volume (WTO, 2003) being
moved by the ships. In addition the efficiency of the maritime transport sector has
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been improving day by day. But quests to achieve even greater efficiencies are often
accompanied by problems like accidents and shipwrecks, pollution and death of
crews, and the evolution of two perfectly adapted pathogens namely, a modern and
sophiscated strain of piracy and its close cousin, the maritime form of the new
stateless terrorism.

Besides the Santa Maria1 and Achille Lauro2 incident, the

timeline of the events from Oct 2000 onwards shows incidents such as the suicide
attacks on USS Cole3, capture of suspected gun running ship Al Murtada4 by Indian
Coast Guard, suicide attack on Limburg5 in Oct 2002, sabotage of Super Ferry 146
by Abu Sayyaf group, explosion at port Ashdod7 in Israel by suicide bombers in
March 2004 and terrorist acts at Umm Qasr8 near Basra in Apr 2004.
Continuing with the trends witnessed during the previous decades, pirate attacks
worldwide increased in frequency and violence last year, with a total of 445 incidents
being reported as compared to 370 incidents in 2003 with 21 seafarers being killed
and 71 crew and passengers reported missing. It is alarming to note that the number
of attacks using guns rose to 100 from 68 in 2002 and hostages taken nearly doubled
to 359 seafarers. Ships were boarded in 311 instances and a total of 19 ships were
hijacked (International Maritime Bureau, 2004). The important aspect to be borne in
mind regarding the growth of piracy is not the quantity but the growing
sophistication and brutal quality of these attacks.

1

Portuguese Luxury liner was hijacked by own crew in 1961.
Achille Lauro was a Italian cruise vessel hijacked on Oct 7 1985 by four Palestine gunmen in the
eastern Mediterranean sea and one passenger was killed during the incident.
3
USS Cole, a US Naval vessel was attacked by a terrorist boat laden with explosives off Aden
Harbour, Yemen on 12 October 2000 while it was refuelling offshore. 17 crew was killed in that
attack.
4
Al Murtada, was a Lebanese flagged vessel was found abandoned in Indian waters with arms
onboard. For further detailed information, see chapter 4.
5
French Tanker Limburg was attacked by a boat laden with explosives off Yemen on 06 October
2002 and one crew member was killed in the incident
6
The Abu Sayyaf said it had planted the explosive device that started the fire aboard the illfated Super Ferry 14 that left one dead and 180 people missing according to Minda News 01 Mar
2004
7
A truck containing suicide bomber hiding inside the containers detonated themselves at Israeli port
of Ashdod on 21 Jun 2004, killing 10 and injuring 18 port workers.
8
Suicide attackers detonated explosive-laden boats near oil facilities off Umm Qasir in the Persian
Gulf on 25 April 2004, killing two U.S. Navy sailors
2

2

There are increasing signs that the piracy is becoming more organised, more
intensive and ambitious and better coordinated (Armstrong, 2004)9. Aside from
piracy, the other common forms of maritime crime include documentary and charter
party frauds, container crime, insurance fraud, deviation and highjacking.

Contrary to common citizens perception or beliefs and on the basis of general
information available in the public domain, the world is not a safe place. With the
advent of international terrorism and maritime violence, it had in fact become more
dangerous with the multibillion maritime industry that has neglected security for so
long just beginning to understand the extent and ramifications of maritime security
threats in its many myriad forms and hues. A combination of the several factors akin
to maritime industry presents an opportune situation for both the unfeeling terrorist
and the common, petty criminal alike to brutally exploit with the consequences
having the ability to disrupt hundreds, thousands of lives and having the ugly but real
potential to place entire communities at risk by seizing or sabotaging commercial
vessels, port facilities and offshore installations. The perceived risks of the new
threat ranges from disruption of crew and trained manpower supply by terrorizing the
shipping industry, ransom can range above tens of millions of dollars (which are now
realistically demandable) in return for refraining from destroying a US$ 500 million
drilling platform, creating a € 3 billion oil spill, or incinerating an entire port city etc.
Alternative threat scenarios other than piracy and armed robbery could include
containers being used as a Trojan Box either as the medium for delivery of weapons
of mass destruction or as the weapon itself. Other scenarios could be chemical
contamination, gas explosion, cruise manslaughter, oil pollution at choke points and
cyber crimes.
Well before the horrifying September 11 terrorists attacks, transport sector had been
the target of terrorist activities because of their relative easy accessibility and the
potential for inflicting casualties on a large scale. The vulnerability of the transport
9

Dominic Armstrong is the Director of Research and intelligence of the Aegis Defence services
Group
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system highlights the susceptibility of international trade, which thrives on secure
and efficient transport system, to terrorism having an enormous impact on the way
we live and conduct trade and commerce.
Economic impacts
World trade moves through a number of choke points where decisive action could
restrict or even block traffic. The world’s overwhelming reliance on ‘Just–In–Time’
logistics systems and the innate volatility of markets and the shipping industry do not
only present easy targets but also highly strategically important ones.
The impact of maritime violence and terrorism are not only limited to loss of life,
damage to property and environment but also impact the underlying fibre that binds
the global economic landscape together with its impact on the critical infrastructure,
disruption to financial markets. There could also be significant costs to be borne by
nation states in terms of rescue efforts and post attack crisis management as well as
the costs of the remedial measures. In this context, it would be worthwhile to note
that the threat of terrorist attacks has wiped out around half of the logistics
productivity gains realised in the US over the past 10 years (OECD, 2003)10. Further,
the ongoing threat of terrorism and maritime violence could also affect the world
economic activity through its impact on business and investment decisions. The
possibility of future terrorists acts creates uncertainty, which increases perceived
risks and the risk premium demanded by the investors.
The maritime transport sector is particularly vulnerable to terrorism due to its diverse
and large international labour force serving onboard ships, large number of
intermediaries which provide support services from freight-forwarders to stevedores
with its complex system encompassing different legal systems, maritime security
systems, varying degrees of maritime emergency response preparedness, coastal
10

Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) formed in 1961 is a forum
comprising 30 developed countries to discuss develop and refine economic and social policies
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states preparedness to respond to incidents and different standards of port state
control (PSC) inspections regime. The perceived regulatory regime with lowest
common denominator approach poses a significant challenge to the maritime security
situation.
1.2

Maritime security and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)

Since its creation in 1958, the International Maritime Organization, as the United
Nations’ rule-making body responsible for the safety of life at sea and environmental
protection, has adopted a great number of conventions and regulations. Concern
about unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their
passengers and crews has been addressed by IMO since the 1980s (IMO, 2004). If
one were to revisit the milestones of the achievement of the International Maritime
Organisation, it can be observed that the organisation has responded to the historic
disasters that affected passenger and crew safety and to the marine environment by
adopting conventions, such as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), 1974, and International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto. (MARPOL
73/78) In the field of maritime security, the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 (SUA 88) was
adopted as a result of the Achille Lauro incident while the ISPS Code was developed
in response to the September 11 incident in New York.
It needs to be emphasised that maritime security has always had been an important
agenda item at IMO long before the 9/11 incident and has been a permanent feature
of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) since the early 80s.

However, the

incidents of 9/11 surprised a great majority of security agencies and international
regulatory bodies and caught everyone flat footed. The impact was so overwhelming
that it awoke the organisations dealing with international transportation of goods and
passengers to react proactively so as to be caught by any new surprises. IMO did not
lag behind and fast-tracked the development of an instrument, which provides
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uniform global standard for the prevention of terrorists’ attacks against ships and port
facilities. While the “threat to maritime security” has now become synonymous to
maritime terrorist act, it is actually a broad area that covers a wider range of issues
than the terrorist attacks similar to that of 9/11. It encompasses piracy, armed
robbery, high jacking, stowaways, illegal migrants, narcotics, arms smuggling, fraud
and others (Mejia, 2002).
The chronology of IMO measures in respect of maritime security include:
(a)

In 1983, Assembly resolution A.545 (13) Measures to prevent acts of

piracy and armed robbery against ships, to address the specific problems
relating to piracy and armed robbery pursuant to the Achille Lauro incident.
(b)

In 1985, Resolution A. 584 (14) on Measures to prevent unlawful acts

which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and
crews.
(c)

In 1986, the MSC approved MSC/Circ.443 on Measures to prevent

unlawful acts against passengers and crew on board ships, intended for
application to passenger ships engaged on international voyages of 24 hours
or more and the port facilities which service them. The measures encourage
Governments, port authorities, administrations, shipowners, shipmasters and
crews to take appropriate measures to prevent unlawful acts, which may
threaten passengers and crews. The measures also stresses the need for port
facilities and individual ships to have a security plan and appoint a security
officer which make obvious that the measures as similar to that propounded in
the ISPS code has been made as recommendatory measure by the IMO way
back in 1986.
(d)

In March 1988, a conference in Rome adopted the Convention for the

Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(SUA). It includes provisions for the absolute and unconditional application
of the principle either to punish or to extradite persons who commit or who
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are alleged to have committed offences specified in the convention. A
protocol extends the provisions of the Convention to unlawful acts against
fixed platforms located on the Continental Shelf (Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf, 1988). The two instruments both entered into force on
01 March 1992.
The main purpose of the SUA treaties is to ensure that appropriate action is
taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships (and fixed
platforms on the continental Shelf), which include the seizure of ships by
force, acts of violence against persons on board ships, and the placing of
devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it. The treaties
oblige Contracting Governments to either extradite or prosecute alleged
offenders. IMO's Legal Committee is reviewing the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
1988 and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988 (the SUA treaties)
(e)

In 2002, IMO has issued revised MSC circulars MSC/ Circ.622 and

MSC/ Circ 623 recommending governments to prevent and suppress piracy
and armed robbery and providing guidance to shipowners, shipmasters and
crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery.
(f)

In November 2001, the IMO Assembly adopted the code of practice

for the investigation of the crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships
(Resolution A.922(22)) as well as measures to prevent the registration of
phantom ships (Resolution A.923(22)).
(g)

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on 11

September 2001, the United Nations, through Security Council resolution
1373 (2001), called on the international community to redouble efforts to
prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including full implementation of the antiterrorist conventions.
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(h)

A new, comprehensive security regime for international shipping

entered into force on 01 July 2004. The mandatory security measures, adopted
in December 2002, include a number of amendments to the 1974 Safety of
Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), the most far-reaching of which enshrines
the new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).
Apart from evolving conventions, resolutions and circulars providing guidance to all
concerned, IMO implemented an anti-piracy project in 1998. Phase One of the
project consisted of a number of regional seminars and workshops attended by
Governmental representatives from countries in piracy-infested areas of the world;
while Phase Two of the project consisted of a number of evaluation and assessment
missions to different regions. IMO is taking the lead in the proposed development of
regional co-operation activities and agreements.

To assist in anti-piracy measures, IMO issues reports on piracy and armed robbery
against ships submitted by member governments and international organizations. The
reports, which include names and descriptions of ships attacked, position and time of
attack, consequences to the crew, ship or cargo and actions taken by the crew and
coastal authorities, are now circulated monthly, with quarterly and annual
summaries.
The IMO efforts include, inter-alia, accelerated implementation of Automatic
Identification System11, coordination with ILO for a new Seafarer Identification
document12, transparency of ownership and control, ship security alarms systems and

11

Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a shipboard radar display with a overlaid electronic chart
data and includes mark of AIS fitted ship within VHF range and provides salient navigational and
other data.
12
The 91st conference of ILO in Jun 2003 adopted a new convention on Seafarer’s Identity Document
which replaces ILO convention 108 adopted in 1958.
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control, marking of ships with an IMO number13 and installation on ships of the
Voyage Data Recorder (VDR)14, and other issues regarding technical cooperation.
IMO’s Global programme on maritime and port security
IMO launched its global technical cooperation programme on maritime security in
January 2002, 11 months before the IMO Diplomatic Conference on Maritime
Security adopted amendments to the SOLAS Convention and the related
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) in December 2002. The
aim of the global program initially was to raise awareness of maritime security
threats and of the possible future regulatory measures that were being developed at
that stage. The programme was aimed at helping governments strengthen maritime
and port security especially in the developing countries. Activities carried out during
2002 included the development of lesson plans and manuals and the delivery of subregional seminars, workshops and advisory missions.
IMO’s expenditure on the programme as of Jun 2004 is US$ 2,525,304. (IMO, 2004)
Worldwide activities have included 18 regional and 42 national seminars and
workshops. Some 3,320 people have been trained across the ports of the developing
regions and they are now putting into place the practical security mechanisms
necessary to thwart terrorist attacks against ships and ports in their countries. The
demand from member states for practical assistance in the implementation of the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) and other security
measures adopted by IMO is a continuing demand. To facilitate the demands to be
met adequately and appropriately, a new ‘Train-the-Trainer’ programme has been
developed which is assisting governments to strengthen their maritime security

13

SOLAS Reg. XI –1/3 require ships identification number permanently marked on a visible area on
ships hull or superstructure for easy identification.
14
From 1 July 2004 ships are to be fitted with Voyage Data recorders, which serve the purpose as
black boxes for the ship. They are mandatory in accordance to Ch V of SOLAS 74
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implementation through the provision of trained instructors capable of delivering
quality training at regional and national levels using relevant IMO Model Courses.
Another initiative of the IMO is the establishment of International Maritime Security
Trust Fund (IMSTF), on the basis of voluntary donations, and the IMO SecretaryGeneral has appealed to Governments and industry to make contributions to the
Fund, which will support the programme over the coming biennium.
It can be observed that the IMO has responded to security demands not only on an
incident-based level but also proactively. The frequency of the IMO resolutions for
security issues made over the past decade indicate that IMO is constantly aware of
the evolving maritime security situation starting from measures to prevent piracy to
prescribing offences in SUA Convention to the engagement of port facilities through
the ISPS Code. The IMO is constantly aware of the convention law and its
shortcoming and has periodically amended the conventions and resolutions to fit the
current security situation. IMO is only a norm making body and constantly aligns its
work and programmes to the relevant policies, objectives and procedures developed
in the United Nations and other United Nations agencies. However, it needs to be
borne in mind that IMO is not a supra-national body and it does not impose or
enforce rules, it has no power or authority to do so. (Balkin, 2000). Therefore, the
answer to establishing an effective maritime response system for global maritime
security situation does not lie with the solutions made by IMO but by its member
state, through their national administrations by implementing the conventions into
national laws and enforcing them correctly and uniformly. Presently there is no way
that IMO can supervise the implementation of conventions in any state unless the
state volunteers. There are many maritime states, which have not faced any security
threat in their ports or in their coasts, and there are other states whose national policy
priorities are different and do not provide adequate resources for maritime security
due to its high cost and intangible returns. In this situation the maritime security
response system is left entirely with the state’s willingness to implement the
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convention in the true spirit and making concerted effort to enforce it through
properly trained organisation.
1.3

Preventive and response environment

A closer look at the Jane’s Fighting ships15 indicates the resources available with
different countries with respect to their Navies, Coast Guard, Border police and
maritime or port police. While some countries maintain resources for national
security, and for the protection of resources in their jurisdiction, the mercantile
marine is almost left to its own devices. This is most likely due to the infrequency of
security incidents and the fact that the merchant vessels, which traverse the coastal
state’s waters, fly international flags. There is a conflict of jurisdictional regime, and
of control and in many cases the national laws are not clear regarding who is to
respond or react to security situations at sea during peacetime.
One must be circumspect when discussing the involvement of military forces in civil
affairs. This is particularly true in the case of the control issues of ISPS Code. Even
in the high seas there are more than a few merchant ships masters who view the need
to share sea-lanes with the naval forces as somewhat of a nuisance.16

When dealing with the acts of terrorism, however, issues involving the protection of
civil interests from criminal acts become merged with issues of national security.
Under such situations the protection of civil property interests becomes secondary.
This is one of the fundamental reasons why it is considered that the interests of the
civil maritime community can be best served by emphasising precautionary and
preventive measures as opposed to – after the fact – rescue or punitive measures. In

15

Jane’s fighting ships is a comprehensive source of fighting ship information and is an authority on
World Navies.
16
RAdm Bruce Harlow USN, -The role of Military force to protect ships and ports against terrorist
attacks –– Violence at Sea, ICC, 1986.
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this regard, it is helpful to understand the distinction – between an act of terrorism on
one hand and an act of piracy, mutiny or insurrection on the other.
Until recently or after September 11, the act of terrorism was viewed primarily as a
criminal matter to be dealt with by civil authorities. When the level of violence is
sufficient to impact on fundamental national interests, then the issue becomes one of
national security. There are no international conventions, which specifically address
the issues of terrorism at sea, albeit the SUA 88 convention does so to some extent,
as preventive and response measures (Civil plus Military) and ISPS code as total
preventive measures (Civil oriented only).
It can be seen that an appropriate response to an act of violence against a merchant
ship may vary in accordance with the particular circumstances. The expected level of
involvement of military forces of the flag state will likewise vary, in accordance with
the circumstances surrounding each particular case.
There are various methods followed by different states, which have organised their
maritime security infrastructure for the protection of ships and port facilities, and
they are generally patterned in three forms. The first one exercising full control over
the merchant marine issues as in the case of the US Coast Guard and Chilean Coast
Guard. The second form is that of Greek national maritime administration (civil)
having regulatory function for issuing ISSC and Greek Coast Guard overseeing the
security issues. The third form is having full control of all maritime security issues
with the civilian maritime administration like that of India which has the Coast
Guard or Navy responding to security situations as required basis. The result is that
in states having civilian oriented maritime administration dealing with maritime
security, the law enforcement organisation who are to react on ad-hoc basis are not
adequately made aware of the happenings at the IMO and the response system is one
made on cautious approach. The spectrum of maritime security response is so wide
in the sense that USCG conduct the audit and certify the International Ship Security
Certificate and on the other hand a virtually nameless company having some security
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credentials performs security assessment and certification for ships which are flagged
in distant open registries run by countries which will or cannot bear any
responsibility for their acts.
What the IMO security conventions require apart from the legal regime is the
establishment of preventive measures and deterrence through risk based assessment
and availability of some system for immediate response. The administrations have
taken advantage of the provision of delegating security obligations to the Recognised
Security Organisation (RSO)17 and the ready availability of RSOs mostly made of
Classification Societies has made the task easier for the most administrations. The
maritime security forces having took no part in the security assessment of the ships
or the ports cannot join together its operational policies to effectively institute
security measures and respond to security situations correctly. No matter how
security conscious that maritime administration may be, for effective response, the
non involvement of security forces will prove costly and the security forces even if
dovetailed at a later stage into the system will not be effective as the process involve
continuous training, exercise and readiness.
There are no measures that can be taken to prevent a terrorist attack. Well-planned
and effective security measures will reduce the vulnerability of a facility or mode of
transportation to a terrorist attack. The threat of terrorist attack adds a new dimension
to security in the maritime industry Fighting terrorism requires a whole series of
countermeasures in the political, diplomatic, legal, economic and military spectre,
and the action of governments as well as private interests. The reliance on private
military companies for point protection is not recommended because the fine line
between protection and criminality is blurred. A strategy dependent upon
identification and elimination of specific threats will have to be combined with
another strategy focused on preventing larger threats of potentially catastrophic
consequences.
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1.4

Focus of this study

The theme for the IMO for the current year is “IMO 2004: Focus on Maritime
Security”. Accordingly the study focuses on the present maritime security threat
scenarios and the IMO’s effort to respond to the maritime security issues. The
adoption of many security convention and resolution may be adequate but unless the
national administration puts the measures into its national laws and enforces the laws
uniformly, the convention, especially security convention does not serve its intended
purpose. Even when the national laws are in place, it needs a sound policy and
strategy and contingency plans. Even if plans are in place, it requires dedicated force
and resources to enforce the laws. Even if the force and resources are adequate unless
they are trained and exercised sufficiently, they don’t serve the purpose.

For

reaching a sufficient level of training, we need international and regional cooperation
to achieve certain level of standards.
The study looks into the various maritime threats and primarily focuses on piracy and
maritime terrorism and the state of affairs, as it is prevalent today. It goes on to
analyse the international legal regimes with respect to UNCLOS, SUA 88 and its
protocol and the amendments to SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code. The
dissertation’s central theme is to study, whether the national maritime
administrations have woken up to the new maritime security reality and whether they
can manage to respond to security threats alone or in cooperation with other entity.
Due to paucity of time, a detailed questionnaire has been sent to few-selected
developing maritime nation present in four continents of Asia, Africa, Europe and
South America to analyse the national maritime infrastructure and the maritime
security response system. The study makes a deep analysis of an important maritime
nation, India, and its maritime security scenario. In addition, the paper will analyse
the adequacy of the present security models in the developing countries as against the
models being followed in the developed countries and whether some uniformity can
be brought about to produce a global front against the maritime security threats.
17

IMO MSC Circular 1074 provides information on guidelines for authorisation of RSO
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The study concludes by recommending states to adopt a new set of security
procedures

and

proposes

a

standard

security

enforcement

strategy

for

implementation. It also makes suitable recommendations as to what further efforts or
steps could be taken by IMO and other international organisation in dealing with
threats faced by the shipping industry.
1.5

Methodology

The methodology adopted for the study is to analyse the current security scenarios
through published journals and books as well as the security reports in newspapers,
web pages of the security related agencies and international organisations.
The study thereafter analyses the legal regimes through a survey of conventions and
relevant published articles. The analysis of security issues in selected states is
undertaken by sending questionnaires to their maritime administrations. Information
has also been gathered from the IMO websites’ Global Integrated Ship Information
System (GISIS)18, which has provided valuable information of the status of the
maritime security regimes being adopted in the selected states. Information was also
provided by the Indian Coast Guard for the security related incidents, which have
occurred in the past years and has been thoroughly analysed and integrated into the
study to support the present situations described.
Since the study focuses on maritime security issues which are dynamic in nature, it is
found that there are not many scholarly books written recently addressing the subject
and the pace of writing has not kept pace with the sudden spurt of maritime security
issues. The ideas put forward are basically drawn from the security related practices
and the experiences gained by the author by serving in an organisation having

18

Global integrated shipping information System (GISIS) is a database which facilitates the
communication of maritime security-related information by Contracting Governments, pursuant to
SOLAS regulation XI-2/13
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maritime security mandate and also studying maritime security issues at the World
Maritime University.
1.6

The contents

The contents of the study therefore arranged in seven chapters which commences
with a brief introduction to the threats to shipping and the work of IMO and the
current security response environment. Thereafter, it discusses maritime threats in
detail in Chapter Two with particular focus on maritime terrorism and piracy related
issues.
The international legal regimes and the enforcement issues are discussed in Chapter
Three while the maritime security regimes of selected states are discussed in Chapter
Four with a deep focus on the study of Indian maritime security. Chapter Five deals
with global maritime security regimes and the initiatives of international
organisations and Chapter Six proposes a maritime security strategy for enforcement
and Chapter Seven concludes by putting forth some recommendations
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CHAPTER 2
THREATS TO SHIPPING
2.1

The General Maritime Threat

Maritime threats have existed ever since commerce went to sea. Now, with its
existence accepted, the remaining task is to identify its impact and extent as well as
in what capacity and in what dimension, to map and mitigate them wherever
possible. There are threats, which occur directly to ships by acts of piracy, maritime
violence, hijacking and capturing crew for ransom. There are also terrorist acts which
affect crew and property and there are indirect threats which affect shipping
operations by placing of devices, illegal migrants, drug and human smuggling,
stowaways, container crimes, deviation, charter-party and insurance fraud (IMB,
2004). Conventional wisdom suggests that the indirect threats can be prevented
through concerted action by the industry, the shipping companies and the ship
themselves. On the other hand, the direct threats which usually occur at sea is most
worrisome due to jurisdictional issues, unarmed ships crew tactics versus determined
killers and also abject helplessness of seafarers when assistance is not forthcoming
and eventually the crew’s capitulation and subjugation to the demands of the
perpetrators of such heinous crime. In this chapter, an attempt is made to identify and
discuss the effects of two direct threats- terrorism and piracy, which includes armed
robbery, maritime muggings, hijackings and kidnap for ransom.
The maritime environment by its very nature is an amorphous and opaque
environment. It is an important conduit for global activity. High value cargoes sail
with minimal protection. Often, seafarers with dubious qualification and with
uncertain personal IDs are drawn from countries, which have internal conflicts with
radical violence. They crew vessels sailing under flags whose administration has no
physical or administrative wherewithal to carry out background checks. Un-policed
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waters typify large sea areas and security arrangements reflect territorially based
regional or local security arrangements. Under these situations, the two most serious
security threats, that is piracy and maritime terrorism have propped their heads high
and are threatening the safe and efficient conduct of the shipping industry today more
than ever. Maritime terrorism is not a new phenomenon and has existed for several
decades in its many hydra-headed manifestations. In 1985, Palestinian terrorists
hijacked an Italian cruise liner, the Achille Lauro with a passenger being killed
during the ensuing hostage crisis. Militants in Yemen blew a hole in an American
warship, the USS Cole, in 2000, and another in a French oil tanker, the Limburg, in
2002. Abu Sayyaf, a terrorist outfit from the Philippines, bombed a ferry in Manila
Bay earlier this year lending credence to the fact this inhuman form of barbarianism
and bloodletting exists and threatens the entire global maritime community.
Whereas the international maritime law and enforcement regimes did address the
security issues of the ships per se mainly dealing with piracy and maritime violence,
the recent risk assessments of the security threats indicate that the targets for the
terrorists are not material or monetary gains. Rather, terror groups are after the kind
of publicity and media glare that can be generated by an attack against a ship or port
facility.
There are more than 6,000 ports located all over the world serving international ships
and other hundreds of thousands of minor ports, which interconnects national and
international waters. A large volume of cargo is transported as well as millions of
passengers moved each year. These ports are a likely target for terrorism, smuggling
and other criminal acts because of their vast size, easy accessibility, location and
proximity to large cities, roadways, bridges and petro-chemical facilities. In today’s
climate of political unrest and general uncertainty, the lack of security awareness
amongst the personnel who work in and around ports and port facilities compounds
the situation to more worrisome levels.
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Over the last few decades and years, the shipping industry as a result of sustained
regulatory efforts, is in the process of upgrading security awareness in the ships
through IMO efforts and the industry’s efforts instituted worldwide. However, from a
security perspective, the maritime world still poses a significant challenge with the
maritime world yet to wake up to the full implications and ramifications of this
omnipresent and very real threat.
2.2

Maritime terrorism

The seizing of the cruise liner Achille Lauro was one of the several major terrorist
incidents at sea. It was not the most violent, nor was it the most protracted episode of
terrorism on the high seas. It lasted only two days. However, because it happened at
a time of rising terrorism worldwide, and because it involved an international target
that the public was not accustomed to associating with the acts of terrorism, the
Achille Lauro hijacking had a special symbolic as well as substantive importance.
Among the issues that arose after the incident was the speculation as to whether the
maritime transport sector will become a continuous and soft target for hostage taking
for ransom as well as for political reasons. The sharp decline in Mediterranean
cruises following the sea jacking was but a natural reaction and the US$ 1.5 billion
law suit filed by the family of slain American passenger Leon Klinghoffer against the
owners and operators of Achille Lauro, the tour operators, and the Italian port
officials best illustrate the enormous financial risks that terrorism poses for the
maritime community. The incident also exposed the issue of security in ports,
onboard security risks, the legal vacuum, inadequate organisation and administrative
mechanisms and lack of international cooperation, which eventually led to, strained
relations between the interested states. (Jacobsson, 2002).
In view of the foregoing, it can be summarised that the terrorist threat is a function of
the terrorist’s will, the terrorist’s capability, and the target’s perceived importance. In
the maritime sphere, some terrorist organisation with global influence has
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transformed all three factors. In the modern sense, terrorism is imitative and
adaptive, learning from other groups and wider trends to inflict barbaric suffering
mostly on the unsuspecting and the innocent.
A precise definition of terrorism from the sufferers point is difficult to postulate.
However, terrorism can be best defined as “as a premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or
clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience” (US Department of
Defence, 2004). Organisations that employ terrorism as their principle means of
action lack the capability to persist in open armed contest with regular government
forces. They compensate for this weakness through stealth and by choosing ‘soft’,
high value or strategic targets. Over the years, lack of awareness by maritime players
and increased security awareness in other areas like aviation has made commercial
shipping one such attractive target. Prior to the discussions on ISPS Code and
amendment to SOLAS Chapter XI-2, there are already 12 international conventions
in place addressing terrorism and also a number of regional conventions and they all
call to address the terrorism issues pertaining to land based matters and aviation
security (Jacobsson, 2002, p159).
As it becomes more difficult for terrorists to gain access to worthwhile targets on
land and in the air, it is likely that they will consider attacking sea targets, especially
commercial shipping. Unlike the counter-terrorism measures adopted in the Land-Air
sector, the counter-terrorism operations in the sea sector is entirely a different tactic
and needs a dedicated organisation, resources, training, awareness and cooperation
and international support.
The issues of terrorism are much more relevant particularly to the developing
maritime states which are planning to put in place an adequate response measures by
establishing a new infrastructure or organisation for maritime violence or by re-
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orienting their existing law enforcement agencies to establish response measures for
maritime terrorism and other illegal acts at sea.

Terrorist tactics
The tactics used by the terrorists in the maritime environment can be roughly divided
into two categories i.e.
-

Causing damage to ships to cause a sensational event through loss of life and
property.

-

Causing damage to ships to block a navigational highway and bring about
collective economic loss

Unlike attacking ships at sea, which is generally carried out by suicide bombers,
stationary vessels at anchor or alongside can be attacked with relative ease
employing low technology devices and in many cases may not require the use of a
boat. With the coming into force of the provisions of the ISPS code, one might
assume the port is now well protected at least for addressing the foreseeable risks. If
the sea area from the anchorage or fairway to the general sea-lane areas which are
risk prone are not protected, this particular area becomes vulnerable for terrorists for
boarding high value targets like cruise liners, LPG/LNG ships or tankers and use it
for their advantage. The most common method of terrorist attack on ships at sea is
utilisation of fast moving, small craft, which do not have much endurance. These
craft maybe armed with heavy machine guns or rocket or grenade launchers or have
the capability to deploy mines in heavy traffic area.
The tactics adopted by terrorist organisations have other common characteristics that
need to be understood and appreciated. First, terrorists control the venue of their
attacks. Although isolated attacks may occur anywhere, persistent operations are
more likely to be concentrated in regions where the terrorists enjoy some measure of
popular local support in one form or the other.
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Second, terrorist groups control the tempo of their activities and usually benefit from
protracted, low level operations. This can pose a challenge to counter terrorism
response measures because of the difficulty in maintaining the long-term political,
operational and logistical support necessary to achieve meaningful success. Third,
terror attacks are frequently intended to provoke an excessive response by the target
government or military force. If an aggrieved government yields to this approach, it
would unnecessarily place considerable strain on the transportation system and has
the potential to cause more damage than the intended act of terrorism itself.
Fourth, surprise and deception are key elements in nearly all terrorist operations.
This not only increases the danger to the target, but it also complicates the planned
response measures.
Fifth, terror groups can improve the precision and effectiveness of their attacks by
incorporating suicide tactics. It serves as a force multiplier in terrorist operations and
compliments surprise and deception. The threat of suicide attacks also complicates
the formulation of conventional rules and protocols of engagement, order of battle,
etc., and can challenge the restraint of the law enforcement agency.
Sixth, terrorist organisations are known to sometimes finance their operations
through organised crime, drug smuggling, and other illicit activities. In the maritime
arena, these activities include piracy. Accordingly, maritime regions that suffer from
high levels of violent organised crime are also vulnerable to overlapping maritime
terrorist operations.
Seventh, the terrorist organisation work on a close knit level and never discuss or
disclose their intent to any outsiders and they never use a particular conveyance or
mode of transport so as to enable the establishment of routine, well crafted
surveillance and intelligence gathering activities. This causes more deception and
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invariably gives the terrorist and terrorist organisations the added advantage of the
element of surprise.
Finally, geography and distance set limits on terrorist operations. This is especially
significant in the maritime environment. It is very difficult for a terrorist to operate in
the high seas undetected and to ameliorate this disadvantage; terrorist groups exploit
the concept of restrictive geography, such as ports, harbours, straits, coastal
waterways and archipelagos for undertaking and targeting their subversive activities.

2.3

Piracy and Armed Robbery

To provide an insight into the murky but extremely dangerous and deadly world of
maritime piracy, relevant excerpts from the Aegis Defence Maritime Terrorism
Report - June 20041 is reproduced, which states as follows:
The maritime industry faces a new threat. Piracy is growing at 20% per
annum, thriving on a combination of vulnerable, undermanned ships carrying
both dangerous and valuable cargoes sailing in un-policed waters. However,
the threat is not from traditional commercial pirates, but from a new breed of
maritime terrorist, whose skills evolve from a conventional piracy base, but
whose aims and goals are more sinister, and whose potential to wreak havoc
with the global supply chain is still largely unrecognised. The ISPS Code,
coming into force on 1st July 2004, as well as CSI2 and CTPAT3, all help
raise awareness of the security issue, but cannot hope to solve this
fundamental problem in their own right.
1

Aegis- Defence Security services based at UK produces Maritime Terrorism Report every year for
commercial use.
2
Container Security Initiative (CSI) a preventive measure by US customs against terrorist threat
against good imported through container into the US ports.
3
Customs – Trade Partnership Against Terrorism is a new effort by US customs for entailing
stakeholders to participate in cooperative security initiatives for protecting the maritime supply chain.
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The Rand Maritime Report 2003 4 on the piracy issues of Africa states that in many
ways the Horn and West coast of Africa represent the near perfect environments in
which to engage in illicit maritime activities. There exists a ready supply of potential
targets; ineffective mechanisms for coastal and port surveillance; economic
underdevelopment; and limited opportunities for legal prosecution in the event that a
group is ultimately compromised.
On issues affecting the Malacca strait the IMB Director5 states that large population,
meagre fish catches and dwindling income for fishermen and unemployed seamen
and fishermen and presence of narrow channels, shallow reefs, thousands of tiny getaway islands, and slow traffic with some 900 commercial vessels passing through
each day make the waters around Singapore, Malaysia and neighbouring Indonesia a
pirate's dream.
Merchant ships have always been vulnerable to piratical attacks, and today, as the
number of seafarers on board ships is falling whilst the weapons available to
attackers become more sophisticated, this vulnerability is steadily increasing. They
often started as "maritime muggings" during which ships are boarded and the
attackers seek cash and valuables. Then there are highly organised criminal gangs
who hijack the ship and her cargo, selling the latter into the underworld and perhaps
even trading the ship under a new name using forged papers. Both types of attacks
are dangerous, often involving violence, which on some unfortunate occasions has
involved whole crews being killed.
Incidence of piracy has shown a marked increase since the end of cold war
numbering 2,375 actual and attempted attacks between the year 1991-2001 which
equates to an average of 215 attacks per year and the 66 percent of the attacks

4
5

The RAND corporation is a non profit research organisation and focuses on issues of Security
Capt P Mukundan is the Director of International Maritime Bureau based at London
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occurred in the South East Asian Region. In 2003 the attacks rose to 445 and this was
the second highest number of attacks since the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in
Kuala Lumpur started compiling statistics in 1991. The highest number was 469
incidents in 2000. It stated that 21 seafarers were known to have been killed,
compared with 10 the previous year - and 71 crew and passengers were listed as
missing (IMB, 2004). The number of attacks using guns rose to 100 from 68 in 2002
and hostages taken nearly doubled to 359 seafarers. Ships were boarded in 311
instances and a total of 19 ships were hijacked.
The importance of the growth rate in piracy lies not in the quantity, but in the quality
and sophistication of the attacks. There are increasing signs that piracy is becoming
more organised, more intensive, more ambitious and better conceived, connected and
implemented. The origin of piracy arises from three principal factors of economic,
political and regulatory bases. These factors are not touched upon, as they are not
found relevant here and hence not discussed. However, the regulation on piracy is
discussed in chapter 3 in adequate detail.
Present day piratical attacks
While most incidents of piracy are considered short term (pirates often remain
onboard for less than thirty minutes), incidents of long term (seizures which last for
several days and eventually hijacking and theft of whole cargos) are becoming more
frequent and represent the presence of more organised form of piracy. Piracy is likely
to remain a persistent problem in many regions of the world especially around the
developing maritime nations. Under reporting of incidents by the industry causes an
inaccurate count of the true nature of the problem. For many, maritime piracy has not
yet reached the level at which concerted action is generally seemed necessary.
Financial losses to the industry have seemingly remained tolerable, so piracy has
been so far viewed as a nuisance rather than as an imminent danger of substantial
proportions and having an innate ability to bring the entire maritime industry to its
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knees. Without a strong voice and concentrated impetus from the industry and the
other maritime constituents, governments till now have been reticent to commit to
the much-needed response measures.
2.4

The effects of the attacks on shipping

The ramifications and consequences of piracy are extensive. The immediate victims
of pirate attack are the crewmembers aboard targeted vessels. They are normally
threatened, often beaten, sometimes murdered. The fear of attack is very real and
tangible in the minds of many seafarers. The shipping industry suffers financial loss,
both directly and indirectly. More difficult to mend, however may be the tarnished
reputations that repeated attack might cause. With the advent of the ISPS code, the
ships may be tainted or black listed. This may cause the ships not to report pirate
attack to the piracy reporting centre and thereby reducing the avenue to get accurate
information about the exact attack and the extent. The potential exists also for the
shipping industry to incur crippling losses. The effects of an underway collision
occurring during or immediately after attack like that of incident of Petro Ranger6
could be catastrophic. In those instances where crewmembers are injured or killed
during pirate attacks, negligent security or failure to comply with relevant security
conventions litigation might be filed, charging shipping companies with failure to
provide security. Perceptions of a local piracy problem might adversely affect the
local economy. Levels of international investment may be influenced by the safety
of regional shipping. Ports may suffer if trade is transferred to safer regions.

Maritime security impact on shipping economics
While the cost of unchecked piracy and maritime terrorism are significant for all
economies, they can impose a disproportionately high cost on developing countries
6

MT Petro Ranger is a Malaysian registered ship which was attacked by pirate in the Malacca Straits
in Apr 1998 and the ship’s bridge was unmanned for many hours during the attack
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trade and growth as most developing maritime states depend heavily on maritime
trade flows with North American and Western Europe and other Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies. Many developing
states rely on receiving foreign direct investment inflows and recent increase in
maritime security issues could raise risk premiums and reduce Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) inflows to the economies, which are considered to be at risk.
Insurance premiums could be higher on cargoes and vessels travelling to the ports of
developing economies due to insurer’s uncertainty of the security conditions. The
new clauses under the voyage and time charterparty allocate costs and spread of risks
to the shipowner for violations of ISPS code provisions and all other costs due to
delay at ports for security on the charterers. (Todd, 2004) Many charters exclude the
liability of either or both parties in the event of piracy and other perils. It is found
that the pro shipowner clauses try to allocate risks to the charterers and the charterers
especially oil majors try their bargaining power and try to move the costs under ISPS
Code delays to the shipowner. There are some areas of delay, which can be enforced
by the ports caused by neither shipowner nor charterer’s fault. Here the ISPS inspired
risks fall on the ship owner or charterer depending upon the interpretation of clauses
and in some cases, both parties may share costs equally7. In this situation the
commercial community may not give the due attention to the ISPS code
requirements. When the matters finally fall on the lawyers lap for interpretation and
claiming damages, it will have severe implication on the efficiency of maritime
transportation. It is a forgone conclusion that present day modern and efficient
maritime transport systems underpins international trade, business travel and tourism
and thus impacts on world growth and economic welfare. Any interruption or
collapse of the transport system would impose high costs on the world economy.
Having discussed the threats and its implication on shipping it is but natural to seek
what measures that the public international organisations and the maritime sector has

7

INTERTANKO STB clause found at
http://www.intertanko.com/pdf/weeklynews/securityclauses2.pdf.
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taken to respond to the rising threats and the next chapter on international legal
regimes will discuss on the adequacy and lacunae of the present legal regimes which
directly address the maritime threats
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CHAPTER 3
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES AND ENFORCEMENT
3.1

General International Maritime Law

Apart from international agreement’s concerning slavery and piracy and to a certain
degree on the illicit carriage of drugs, unfortunately, presently there is no
comprehensive existing international maritime law which has universal coverage and
acceptance for maritime crimes. In this legal vacuum, there has, therefore, developed a
complex web of coastal state jurisdictions, Fisheries Zone legislations, Exclusive
Economic Zones legislation, Continental Shelf legislation and few others and these
jurisdiction have been adopted by individual states varying from three miles to
hundreds of miles from their own coast lines.
The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that, by common agreement,
jurisdictions can ‘overlap’. This has given rise to a situation whereby both flag states
and port states can each exercise their own jurisdiction over the same vessel in the same
place. As a result, there have been instances when these laws have been contradictory,
and are subject to the discretion of local national law enforcement agencies.
Nevertheless, in an increasingly complex world there is a growing sense of frustration
with criminal activity at sea. After the world wars, society has become much more
ordered and there is a consequent growing expectation of the need to establish and
maintain good order and instil responsible governance all over the globe, with the seas
being no exception.
As aware, the original threat to ships security came from pirates who tried to gain
control of the ship and steal cargoes. Having taken into consideration of the seriousness
of the problem, the 1958 Convention on High Seas Convention and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) addresses the acts of piracy at sea
and treated such crimes as to be universal crimes and deigned that these acts are
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punishable under the laws of every state. Additionally, it set certain conditions before
an act could qualify as an act of piracy.
The practitioners of maritime law will be aware of consequences because they have to
both comply with and thereafter apply an ever-growing body of law, much of which is
directly related to that Convention and all of which must now be consistent with it.
Under UNCLOS, there are perhaps two central questions that needs clear answers and
they are, primarily what crimes have been established by the LOSC 82 and secondly
how does that law affect the way in which crime is tackled?
While a legal process and effective criminal justice system can be assumed to exist
within most states, the oceans are not, for the most part, contained within states
boundaries. Indeed, the only parts of them that which could be described, as falling
within the territorial boundaries of states are the comparatively narrow coastal zones
within the territorial sea limits. As the oceans fall outside the ambit of territory of a
state and are by far international in nature, it may be prudent to presume that
international law (LOSC 82) fulfils roughly the same function over the oceans as the
way domestic or municipal laws does within states. Sovereign states benefit from an
effective lawmaking process and the means and methods for enforcing it. While it
appears there is an equivalent international law making mechanism and enforcement
process, in reality there is not. International courts such as the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) do not try individuals. They essentially make legal rulings
on disputes between states and do so only if the states concerned have agreed to be
bound by the court’s decision. Despite a resurgent UN in recent years there is no
universally effective law enforcement body or set of arrangements capable of policing
the sea except a few regional arrangements.
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3.2

Law of the Sea Convention 1982

In the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Seas 1982 (UNCLOS 82), there
are two examples of reprehensible behaviour that have long been recognised in the
International Maritime Law. Their existence in customary international law led to them
being included as a matter of course, in both the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas and in the UNCLOS 82. Article 99 of UNCLOS requires all states to “take
effective measures to prevent and punish the transport of slaves” and Articles 100 to
107 of UNCLOS deals with “Piracy”. While the former is no longer a global problem,
the latter is achieving a different status and it is growing tremendously.
Piracy is quite precisely defined in article 101; however, there have been problems with
the definition because of what it excludes by implication. For example with regard to
the Achille Lauro incident, the act could not be described as piracy as the perpetrators
were passengers in the seized vessel and they were motivated by political conviction
and not private gain. So, arguably, no politically motivated terrorist or piratical attack
can be described as pirates and no such act would be covered by the UNCLOS
provisions.
The principal significance of the above situation was that maritime terrorism, unlike
piracy, could not be regarded as a crime for which all states are granted jurisdiction to
prosecute. The intricacies and vexing nature of the matter was deliberated upon and
addressed by the IMO and resulted in the adoption and bringing into effect the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, 1988, the result of which was agreement to extend jurisdiction over such
acts to all states that may be affected by them.
It is worthwhile to note that in the case of vessels engaged in either slave trading or
piracy, the provisions now contained in 1982 UNCLOS extends jurisdiction to states
other than merely the flag state of the offending or victim vessel. Apart from piracy,
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which is subject to universal jurisdiction, there are two other forms of behaviour that
are criminal in nature and are mentioned in UNCLOS namely, drug trafficking and
unauthorised broadcasting. Perhaps the other maritime crimes did not obtain that much
importance or seriousness during the discussions of the UNCLOS III as the maritime
security was a non-issue and there were over hundreds of other jurisdictional issues,
which kept them occupied during the negotiations. Undoubtedly, under UNCLOS, the
maritime security is not about searching what provisions are prescribed regarding crime
and security breaches, but it is about looking for adequacy of the jurisdictional
framework that is in place to cope with it.
3.3

Law on Piracy

Piracy is defined in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, Article 101,as follows:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a)

Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or a private aircraft and directed:
(i)

On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
persons or property onboard such ship or aircraft:

(ii)

Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any state.

(b)

Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
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(c)

Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b).

In the past international community, at least in those states, which were affected by
piracy, more and closer attention was paid to the legal definition of piracy and the
alleged reasons behind the acts than to the nature of acts perpetrated. Statistics
according to IMB for the year 2003 indicate that majority of the attacks has taken while
ships was at anchor or in port. Further, the studies (Dubner, 1997) indicate that 61.8 %
of the reported piratical attacks during the period from 1989 to 1993 occurred within the
territorial waters of a country. The LOSC 82 have shrunk the high seas area and
expanded the jurisdiction of coastal states and, therefore, piratical acts committed in
waters as close as 3.1 miles would have suitably fallen under the category of piracy
previously, are now categorised as armed attack, armed robbery, maritime mugging or
petty theft by the National Authority under whose jurisdiction the act of piracy was
committed. The situation becomes worse when the coastal states or port states tend to
be recessive and put forward long and copious arguments as to why there is no problem
of piracy or why they cannot respond in any meaningful way about it any way.
(Abhyankar, 2004). Their general way of responding to such reports is to make the
Master or responsible person to lodge a complaint with local police and thereafter delay
the ship for collection of evidence and to complete other formalities related to criminal
procedures.
Another problem area confronted in the definition of the piracy is the requirement of a
private ship and use of illegal acts or violence against another ship or persons or
property on a second ship. On analysis of the recent IMB statistics on the piratical
attacks that took place recently, it is observed that the pirates either operated a local
craft fitted with outboard motors or any other small craft having an endurance of a few
hours. As such, it would be a wonder if any pirate ships were located on the high seas.
Reports often point to the high profile hijacking gangs often boarding the ship illegally
at the port or at an anchorage and thereafter overpowering the crew. This is another area
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where the definition of piracy in accordance to UNCLOS does not fit the acts that are
grave and dangerous.
The new maritime zones created under UNCLOS 82 have not taken the practical
implications of the piratical acts (Mejia, 2003). Within the meaning of the definition of
piracy in LOSC 82, many piratical acts which took place within some state’s
jurisdiction or which involved only a single ship would not have access to any public
international organisations which can deal with the issue. Efforts by private
international organisations like IMB, ISF, BIMCO, ITF and other maritime associations
do not have any legal standing and they only provide recommendations to the ships and
the shipowners. Real action is required from the government and only IMO can garner,
coordinate and encourage universal governmental action in the maritime sector.
However, the acts akin to piracy did not come under the purview or mandate of IMO
discussions earlier because of the limiting factor of the definition of piracy under
UNCLOS and in IMO if the appropriate committee accommodates the acts akin to
piracy in their discussions, then it might become inconsistent with the IMO’s status as a
specialised agency of the United Nations (Mejia & Mukherjee, 2003b).
The term “armed robbery against ships” was defined by the IMO as any unlawful act
other than piracy, which are directed against persons or property within the jurisdiction
of State. This term was adopted as late as during January 2002 but nevertheless the
resolution is only recommendatory in nature and it is left to the member states to
incorporate the term “armed robbery” in their domestic legislation to prosecute offences
which are piratical in nature but the jurisdictional issues prevented them from taking
any action earlier due to the UNCLOS definition. By defining this definition, various
acts having close similarity with that of piracy can be addressed if only all states
legislate their remedial actions in their national laws.
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3. 4

The SUA 88 Convention

The Achille Lauro incident led to the culmination in the formulation and adoption of the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA) Convention of 1988. This was due in point to the fact that at that
time there was nothing in UNCLOS that could adequately and meaningfully address the
issue of terrorism at sea. It is also pertinent to note that the limitations of the piracy
provision under the UNCLOS Convention have led to the evolution of the concept of
“unlawful acts against maritime navigation.” The preamble of the convention brings out
the important security situation that the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all
its forms has risen to and also underscores the need for developing international
cooperation between states in devising and adopting effective and practical measures
for the prevention of all types of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime
navigation, and the prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators. The articles of the
convention relate closely to the security provisions as provided for in aviation security.1
At the same time, a number of international terrorism conventions had already been
negotiated and concluded but none of them have addressed the issues and situations
prevailing at sea at all, i.e., maritime terrorism. As States started to negotiate the SUA
convention, which was an attempt by the IMO to go a little bit further than its mandate
on safety of lives and ships and to environment protection, it was treading un-chartered
waters in a new area of maritime security and there was no pervious norm making
convention addressing maritime security. It is also a new step for the IMO and in that
situation it could not borrow any parallel legal support from the constitution of the
oceans UNCLOS so far as terrorism and other crimes were concerned. But, the SUA 88
contradicted the then international law of using force at sea. (Jacobsson, 2002, p159).
As all of us are aware that there is a total prohibition by the United Nations on any
country using force against another in accordance with Article 24 of the UN Charter.
1

The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft “ The Hague Convention” 1970
and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation “Montreal
Convention” 1971
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The only time a State is allowed to use force against another state is when it is a matter
of self-defence or if the UN Security Council has taken a decision and authorised
military action. This translates into a situation whereby all other security situations at
sea are basically excluded with the one very important exception being protection of
national security. In such a situation the role of the state transforms and enters from a
peacetime situation into a wartime situation and the rules and protocols of war apply
here, which are different from the international law applied during peacetime.
A quick look at the Convention tells us that the detail of offences outlined in Article 3
in seven paragraphs covering seizure or damage to property, injury, death and related
matters and also deals with attempts and abatement of offences. It also deals with the
application and jurisdictional issues and puts responsibility on flag states and the
offender receiving state and some procedures regarding handing over offender by the
Master of a ship who had apprehended the offender onboard. The Convention also deals
with the extradition and dispute settlement issues under arbitration or under recourse to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The Convention, which is presently ratified by 108 countries,2 provides procedures and
actions to be taken by the member states. However, this does not prescribe any
preventive action but provides jurisdictional issues and legal clarity about the nature of
offences. Further, the convention is silent about the response issues and the
organisational or administrative set up required and also about the granting and
allocation of resources. Common maritime threats such as armed robbery and thefts are
not listed under Article 3 offences and, hence, the acts, which closely resemble piracy,
cannot be addressed under SUA. Scholars also perceive the SUA convention as being
too restrictive in some areas in the sense that it puts emphasis on the requirement that
the unlawful act “endanger the safety of maritime navigation”

(Mejia &

Mukherjee, 2003b). It also raises some very vexing issues such as whether a ship,
which is at anchor or port when attacked or in the sense “it is not navigating” would be
2

Website of AMSA under IMO Documentation
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covered under provisions of the SUA Convention. Can a member state adequately
protect itself by simply ratifying the SUA Convention considering that the nature of
offences under Article 3 is quite violent? The convention has come into force on 01
March 1992, but so far, there is only one prosecution under SUA 88 convention. The
question could be raised as to whether the SUA 88 convention has made or can make
any impact at all? The answer to the above question was only realised after the
dastardly September 11 terrorist attacks at the World Trade centre in New York. In the
aftermath of such horrendous and tragic consequences, the international community
realised that the SUA 88 convention was not adequate to effectively deal with any
conceivable terrorist attacks and other kinds of violent acts. The Legal Committee of
the IMO embarked upon a revision of the SUA 88 Convention and its Protocol and the
majority of the revised materials are the papers submitted by the US delegation. The
proposals draw upon the language and text from other International Conventions, such
as the UN Conventions against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances
(1988), Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Aviation (1988), International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings (1997) and International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (1999) (Mbiah, 2002). The proposed scope of the work involve inclusion of a
wide list of offences under Article 3 such as illicit carriage and use of biological and
chemical weapons and radioactive material which are addressed in various UN
conventions, so as not to leave any loophole for the commission of offences which had
not been thought about. But the adoption of the revised SUA convention and its
Protocol is not expected to come about easily as in the case of the ISPS Code. It
involves sovereignty and jurisdictional issues, which the maritime administration alone
does not want to delve into and find suitable recourse and remedies. The matter is more
political and requires analysis and approval from the State Department, the External
Affairs and Interior Ministry and other related departments and organisation. While the
UN is having several Conventions under its aegis that deals separately with specific
issues with a view to avoid any issue that is political, the amalgamation of all UN
conventions in the revised convention of SUA could put tremendous pressure on the
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contracting government, especially for the developing states and the approval, adoption
and ratification seems like a long and arduous task.
3.5

SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code

Analysis of criminal law content of the international laws stipulates two measure and
those are preventive measures and the punitive measures. The punitive sanction as a
deterrence measure is found relatively weak in the maritime sector as there are many
reasons, like the high possibility of ship evading arrest or the perpetrators escaping
punishment and there are no sanctions, which are high enough to offset the satisfaction.
(Xu, 2004) What punishment can be given to a suicide bomber?

So preventive

measures became the norm for maritime security deliberations at the IMO and therefore
became predominant in all the discussions.
Even though SUA 88 was in place to address all the foreseeable maritime security
threats it was found very much in punitive in nature and the heinous events of
September 11 has clearly demonstrated that existing measures are weak and additional
measures are needed not only to prevent attacks that endanger ships and persons and
property onboard, but also to prevent the ships themselves from being used as
instruments or theatres of terrorist activities. (Mensah, 2003) Accordingly, it was felt
necessary to consider and institute further and more radical changes in the legal regime
in order to ensure maximum security for ships in all areas in which they operated by
incorporating risk reduction methods and preventive actions. In response, the IMO took
action on two separate but inter-related fronts: first through the revision of the relevant
legal instruments and secondly by the adoption of appropriate technical and
administrative measures to support the rules and regulations. The first was the revision
of the SUA Convention as stated earlier and second is the additional practical measures
to safeguard shipping from threats by amending the 1974 SOLAS Convention at the
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security in December, 2002. The adoption of the
SOLAS Amendments and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS)
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constitutes the latest of the responses adopted by the international shipping community
to counter the increasing threats posed by acts of terrorism, especially at the port ship
interface where the terrorist can pose maximum casualty and damage to port and
property. The ISPS Code contains detailed security-related requirements for
Governments, port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A),
together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a second,
non-mandatory section (Part B). The conference also adopted a series of resolutions
designed to add weight to the amendments, encourage the application of the measures
to ships and port facilities not covered by the Code and pave the way for future work on
the subject.
3.5.1

The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code)

The preamble to the ISPS Code states that, as threat increases, the only logical
counteraction is to reduce vulnerability. The Code provides several ways to reduce
vulnerabilities. Ships will be subject to a formal system of survey, verification,
certification, and control to ensure that their security measures are implemented. This
system will be based on a considerably expanded control system as stipulated in the
SOLAS 74/78.
The Code takes the approach that ensuring the security of ships and port facilities is
basically a risk management activity and that to determine what security measures are
appropriate, an assessment of the risks must be made in each particular case. The
purpose of the Code is to provide a standardized, consistent framework for evaluating
risk, enabling governments to offset changes in threat with changes in vulnerability for
ships and port facilities.
The process begins with each Contracting Government conducting port facility security
assessments at ports where the international ship generally call. Security assessments to
cover identification and evaluation of important assets and infrastructures that are
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critical to the port facility, identifying the actual threats to those critical assets and
infrastructure in order to prioritise security measures. The assessment must address the
vulnerability of the port facility by identifying its weaknesses in physical security,
structural integrity, protection systems, procedural policies, communications systems,
transportation infrastructure, utilities, and other areas within a port facility that may be a
likely target. This risk management concept will be embodied in the Code through a
number of minimum functional security requirements for ships and port facilities and
there is a requirement for the port facility to have security plans, port facility security
officers, certain security equipment. In addition, requirements include monitoring and
controlling access, monitoring the activities of people and cargo and ensuring security
communications are readily available.
For ships, these requirements will include ship security plans, ship security officers,
company security officers, and certain onboard equipment. In addition the requirements
for ships include monitoring and controlling access, monitoring the activities of people
and cargo and ensuring security communications are readily available.
3.5.2

Responsibility of Contracting Governments

In order to communicate the threat at a port facility or for a ship, the Contracting
Government will set the appropriate security level. Security levels 1, 2, and 3
correspond to normal, medium, and high threat situations respectively. These levels are
to be set by the contracting government, which shall then communicate this information
to the port facility and ships concerned. The security level creates a link between the
ship and the port facility, since it triggers the implementation of appropriate security
measures for the ship and for the port facility
Additionally, regulation 3 of SOLAS Chapter V provides for ships to have a Ship
Identification Number – A permanent 7 digit IMO number placed on the conspicuous
part of the hull and regulation 5 of SOLAS Chapter V requires the ship to maintain a
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Continuous Synopsis Record – intended to provide onboard record of the history of the
ship with all ships particulars including the name and particular of the owners and
charterers maintained in accordance with the guidelines made by IMO.
SOLAS Chapter XI-2 “Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security” requires
contracting governments to legislate the relevant provisions in SOLAS and ISPS Code
and make rules stating the Designated Authority i.e. the authority responsible for
implementing ISPS code for:
Ship security assessment, plan approval, certification and verification,
Setting security levels for own flagged ships, to port facilities and to other ships
prior to entry into ports and updation of security level

(Regulation 3),

Setting requirements for Declaration of Security,
Setting up procedures at Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) to
receive Ship security alerts (Maritime Security Committee (MSC) Circular
1067),
Setting up equipment at MRCC like Ship security alarms (Regulation 6), MRCC
to pass information to Security Forces Authority (SFA) or to other MRCCs as
appropriate,
Setting up point of contact for ships to obtain advice or to pass information on
security. (Regulation 7),
Control and compliance measures which may involve inspection of ships by
boarding (Paragraph 2.5, Regulation 9),
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Alternate security arrangements (Regulation 11),
Providing information to IMO of the Designated Authority, the persons in
charge for receiving alerts and the persons involved responding to such alerts.
3.6

Adequacies and lacunae

As stated earlier, the UNCLOS definition of piracy provide for any state to take action
in the high seas3 but it has lacunae in the aspect regarding its application as most of the
piratical acts occur within the jurisdiction of the state and also the two ship rule and
motivation aspects prevent states from charging offenders who commits theft and
armed robbery under piracy. In this context, IMO’s efforts to clarify the definition of
armed robbery is a welcome initiative, which aims to include all piratical acts that occur
within state’s jurisdiction as armed robbery, but their resolution is not mandatory and it
is left to the member states to take appropriate action.
The SUA convention fills the gaps created by the UNCLOS definition on piracy and it
has adequacy to prosecute several maritime offences. However, article 3 does not
include armed robbery and theft and other list of threats that can possibly occur and this
convention is basically oriented towards prevention of hijacking of passenger ships. So
far, the application of this Convention for prosecution of offenders has been nil or
minimal. The revision of SUA Convention including all possible offences is a welcome
idea but it has inherent lacunae of being a very onerous, cumbersome and bulky
convention by virtue of it amalgamating all other international security conventions into
the maritime arena. Further, the swift adoption of the amended convention is not
necessarily a foregone conclusion since it is more politically oriented, requiring
substantial and broad based political consensus.

3

Article 105 of the UNCLOS 82 – “Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft”
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The amended SOLAS Convention and ISPS Code impose obligations not only on the
administration of state parties but also on ships, shipping companies and port
authorities. This brings about the adequacy of awareness of the seriousness of the
security threats, which were never given enough or serious attention before. The placing
of IMO numbers on ships and maintenance of continuous synopsis record is very
welcome and can assist the authorities ashore to clearly identify a proper ship and a
pirated or phantom vessel. The control of access and taking security actions through
designated ship security officer by the use of ship security plans can help in thwarting a
possible attempts of maritime offences to take place. But the ISPS code is totally
procedural and it does not in any way relate to the tougher counterpart, the SUA
convention. The actions envisaged are similar to that of ISM Code, and ship is expected
to fulfil all the conditions as enumerated in the ISPS Code. This begets the question can
a ship, which fulfils all the requirement of ISPS code considered to be safe from
threats? It is pertinent to mention here that an anonymous Master was quoted in Lloyds
List as wondering what it is that he is expected to do when a boat loaded with
explosives approaches his vessel at high speed, except to throw the heavy ship security
plan on the approaching boat. This situation reflects, apart from procedural discipline of
the ISPS code, there should be a cooperative effort from the government forces,
designated authority and the port to prevent a situation occurring in the first place. This
means ISPS code should be able to reside with other security legislation, which
provides total security to ships and to the ports and its approaches and other areas in
accordance to the threat assessment made. To provide some alleviation of the situation
to the anonymous master, the total security protective measures would have constantly
monitored the high-risk area and would have maintained a secure zone for ships to
operate. Additionally with sound intelligence and worked up and prepared force, the
suspicious boat would find it tough to plan and conceive the mission in the first place.
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Another perceived lacunae of the ISPS code is the delegation of authority to recognised
security organisation4 (RSO) which in most cases are the Classification Societies who
jumped into the fray for ship security assessment, approving ship security plans and
issuing International Ship Security Certificates (ISSC) and auditing the security system
on behalf of the government.
Maritime security is a concept which cannot be brought overnight by providing a short
training or placing security equipment onboard ships. It requires continuous drilling and
exercise and should become part and parcel of the sailor’s everyday lives. The RSO
carry out security related work for economic consideration and it is not known how
much responsibility and liability they will shoulder should something go wrong with the
ship for which they issued the ISSC. Like ISM Code there is a concern for conflict of
interest issues with various organisations involvement in both consultancy and auditing
aspects of ISPS Code. The fact is ISM audits are now termed as “surveys” and the days
are not far when ISPS audits will be called another “survey” to be done in conjunction
with other surveys.
Another visible lacunae are the speed at which the Statement of Compliance 5 and the
ISSC issued to the ships in the months of June and July 2004. The table 1 below is the
reproduction of the code status obtained from the IMO website and it reflects the
percentage of compliance vis-à-vis the earlier compliance date.

4

IMO, MSC Circular 1074- Interim guidelines for authorization of recognised security organisation
acting on behalf of the administration
5

SOC issued to the port by the contracting governments for fulfilling the requirements in accordance
with the provisions of the ISPS code
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Table 1- ISPS Code status at 0900 on 30 June 2004
(Source IMO website http://www.imo.org/Newsroom)
SHIPS
Governments (46 responses)
Number of ships liable to the Code
Ship Security Plans (SSP) submitted
International Ship Security Certificates (ISSC)
issued

22,539
19,377
11,996

53.2%
(Up from 41.3%
on 25 June)

IACS
Number of ships liable to the Code
Ship Security Plans (SSP) submitted
International Ship Security Certificates (ISSC)
issued

16,784

69.3%

13,005

(Up from 60.8%

11,639

on 25 June)

INTERCARGO
Number of ships liable to the Code
Ship Security Plans (SSP) submitted
International Ship Security Certificates (ISSC)
issued

916
769
513

56%
(As reported on
11 June)

INTERTANKO
Number of ships liable to the Code
Ship Security Plans (SSP) submitted
International Ship Security Certificates (ISSC)
issued

2,175
2,175
1,547

71%
(Up from 56% on
25 June)

IPTA
Number of ships liable to the Code
Ship Security Plans (SSP) submitted
International Ship Security Certificates (ISSC)
issued
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429

99.0%

425

(Up from 71.1%

425

on 25 June)

ICCL
Number of ships liable to the Code
Ship Security Plans (SSP) submitted
International Ship Security Certificates (ISSC)
issued

118

100.0%

118

(Up from 88.9%

118

on 25 June)

BIMCO
Number of ships liable to the Code
Ship Security Plans (SSP) submitted
International Ship Security Certificates (ISSC)
issued

2,622
2,189

18.6%
(As reported on
11 June)
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PORT FACILITIES
Governments (86 responses)
Number of port facilities

7,974

Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP) submitted

4,688

Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP) approved

4,260

53.4%
(Up from 31.9%
on 25 June)

Table 1: Status of ISPS Code as on 30 June 2004, from IMO website
The speed at which the plans and certificates were issued to the ships, in some cases
within one month reflects that the effort looks more like a paper exercise and all interest
is diverted to provide ISSC to the ships so as to make it compliant before the deadline
of 01 July 2004. Fundamental and moral questions abound and remain unanswered as
regards whether such a hurried certification processes, paucity of time etc. to justify the
noble intentions of the persons who toiled hard to produce a convention with an
important global objective.
Another area which ISPS Code exposes its weakness is the application - IMO has
clearly stated that Part A is mandatory and Part B is recommendatory whereas different
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contracting governments has made part A and B both mandatory and some made few
parts of Part B as mandatory and from the figures above it is clearly visible that there
are still many ships which are trading without ISSC. It is still very early in the day to
comment any other existing serious lacunae as far as the ISPS code is concerned and
only time will tell how effective is the code really helping to address the issues which it
is intended for.
To sum up this chapter, reviewing the existing international legal regimes, it is
apparent that there is no one all-encompassing legislation which covers the entire
spectrum of security issues. To ameliorate this situation, the Comite′ Maritime
International (CMI) coordinated Model International Law to assist the countries to
legislate one umbrella maritime Law under which the piracy, armed robbery to the
SUA type offences can be addressed. It removes all the complexities and restrictions
found in the UNCLOS and SUA convention and enrich it with provisions from the
existing international instruments and emphasises that states are the vital component
in the response issues against offences that occur at sea. However CMI is a nongovernmental organisation and they basically produce private international law and
again the adoption of the Model Law needs considerable political will and broad
based consensus as it transcends many other international instruments and also there is
no compulsion for the states for its adoption, ratification and incorporation into
domestic legislative framework. Having identified many differences in the existing
legal regimes let us take a look at the prevailing situation on the ground by visiting the
status of maritime security in few selected states, which have been elucidated in
substantial detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
MARITIME SECURITY REGIMES
4.1 Security system of selected states
Overall, the IMO security conventions provide the broad guidelines for handling
maritime security issues with responsibilities clearly delineated both to the
governments and to the shipping industry. With a view to ascertain the adequacy of
the security conventions and to identify the constraints at the policy formulation and
implementation level, especially in the developing countries, a questionnaire, a copy
of which is placed at Appendix 1 to this document, was forwarded to the Maritime
Administration of India, representing the Asian continent, Chilean Administration
representing the South American continent, Nigeria representing the African
continent and Lithuania representing European continent. The questionnaire was also
sent to bigger shipping companies like Maersk Lines of Denmark and Shipping
Corporation of India and to the maritime law enforcement agency of India i.e. the
Indian Coast Guard.
The Questionnaire basically contained queries for eliciting responses regarding the
threat perception faced by the respective maritime administrations and shipping
companies and to ascertain whether they are party to all of the IMO’s security related
conventions and also to ascertain as to how they are managing the security situation
vis-à-vis the SUA related offences. It also asks about the local piracy situation if any
as well as ships and port security in accordance to ISPS Code and SOLAS Chapter
XI-2. The questionnaire also contained queries for eliciting information regarding the
organisation and security infrastructure that are in place to tackle the security
situation at sea and in ports and also regarding what assistance they look forward
from IMO and the international community and what suggestion they would want to
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put forward for consideration for better implementation, coordination and for
international cooperation regarding maritime security.
Unfortunately, only Chile and Nigeria responded by forwarding their answers to the
said questionnaire and also the Indian Coast Guard regarding the maritime security
situation. Informatively, the sample size was kept to a reasonable level due to the
reasons of severe time constraints allocated within which the proposed study had to
be completed and also taking in to account of the inherent reticent attitude of the
maritime administration’s of contracting states in providing information, especially
relating to security related questions and issues. Further, the Self Assessment Form
of the Flag State Implementation Sub Committee1 (FSI) of the IMO’s experience
indicates that information regarding the implementation and current security situation
will neither be furnished easily and even if it furnished, the same cannot be checked
for its veracity.
However, due to the availability of information on the World Wide Web especially
IMO’s Global Integrated Ship Information System (GISIS), regarding the subject
under discussion, the lack of responses from the identified States’ Maritime
Administration’s did not present itself as a major setback. However, it is true that the
said information from the identified Maritime Administrations could have helped the
author in analysing the ground level situation in a much better and informed way.
Details regarding the gist of information obtained from the various Administrations
are as follows.

1

The SAF received by the IMO indicates that only 50 out of 162 member states have submitted in
2003 and out of that 16 member states repeated the same information provided in the previous year.
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Table 2. Maritime Security information of Selected States
(Source: Answer from questionnaire and website information)

Query
Level of Risk

India
Moderate / Low

Chile
Low

Nigeria
Moderate

Lithuania
No
Information

Party to SUA 88

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

& SOLAS 74
Enactment of
laws &

Information

regulations
Organisation

Indian Coast

DIRECTE

Nigerian

No

responsible for

Guard

MAR

Navy

Information

Guidelines and

Yes, In-house

Yes, with

Yes

No

training for Law

with Coast Guard DIRECTE

coordinating
SUA 88

enforcement

information

MAR

personnel
Any identifiable

Lack of

No

difficulty or

communicat

information

lacunae

ion facilities

Assistance
sought

No

Presently Nil

No

Assistance

Latest

No

through
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Query
How much Part

India
Only part A

Chile

Nigeria

Lithuania

Entire Part

Part A and

EU has

B of ISPS code
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Part B is

made some
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B has been

mandatory

parts of Part

mandatory

made

B

mandatory

mandatory.

Is there any ships
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and ports not

ports

Nil
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No
information

covered under
ISPS Code
Exchange of

Through Nautical Through

Through

No

ISPS

Adviser’s office

RCC

information

ROCRAM

information- how RCC is not

network and

it is coordinated

involved

RCC

Any other

Nil

All ships

Provisionin

No
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g of satellite

information

are fully

communicat

compliant

ion system

with ISPS

for sharing

code

of

information

information
The selected states are important evolving maritime nations and it is felt that an
intimate understanding and analysis of the background information of their geopolitics, economic and trading activities related to the seas and its participation in
regional association activities should provide us with important information for
undertaking a closer observation and analysis of their present security regime and
their response structure.
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4.1.1 Chile:
Background Information: Chile is a maritime nation on the west coast of South
America, having a coastline of 6,435 kilometres. Its major trading partners are the
US, Japan, China, Mexico, Italy, UK, Argentina and Brazil. Its exports include
copper, fish, fruits, chemicals and paper and pulps and its imports include consumer
goods, motor vehicles, industrial machinery and foodstuff. The major Ports are
Antofagasta, Arica, Chanaral, Coquimbo, Iquique, Puerto Montt, Punta Arenas, San
Antonio, San Vicente Talcahuano and Valparaíso and the Chilean economy depends
heavily on the maritime trade. For years, the security concept has been firmly rooted
in the Chilean ports. The Chilean Navy fosters the maritime conscience and the
development of national maritime interests, and also contributes to the security of the
activities that are developed in maritime territory. The Chilean Maritime Authority
(DIRECTEMAR)2 participates actively in the deliberations and proceedings at the
IMO and at national level implements the maritime security for the Chilean
registered ships and ports.
Regional Scope: In the regional scope, the Chilean Navy has an active participation
in the Permanent Commission of the South Pacific (CPPS), which is a multilateral,
closely integrated body with participation from Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, and Chile,
with the purpose of improving the regional cooperation and information exchange to
act as a forum that analyzes topics of operative character, on maritime security, and
protection of the marine environment besides taking part in friendly naval exercises
with Regional Navies and US Navy. The port state control measures of Viña del Mar
and the Tokyo MOU Agreements are incorporated in this Regional Agreement. Chile
is an active member of ROCRAM3 composed of all South American Maritime
Administrations.

2

DIRECTEMAR ( Direccion General del Territorio Maritimo y Marina Mercante) is the Chilean
Maritime Authority and is an organ under the Chilean Navy. It is also some times referred to as the
Chilean Coast Guard.
3
ROCRAM - Regional Operative Cooperation Among South American Maritime Authorities.
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Analysis: Chile with its vast Coastline is heavily dependent upon the seas for its
economy, commerce and trade. There has been no reported incident of piracy or
armed robbery in the Chilean waters. The coasts are well protected by the operating
units under DIRECTEMAR and the Navy. It is no wonder that the Chilean ports had
encountered no problems in respect of complying immediately with the requirements
of the ISPS Code. The shipping activities are well regulated and they have adequate
resources and modern communication facilities to exchange information. It is an
active member in regional associations. Having the US as their major trading partner,
it is prudent to assume that they will have no problem in participating with their
layered security prescriptions.4 The DIRECTEMAR having a disciplined and trained
manpower are adequately prepared to meet any security challenges at sea.
4.1.2 Nigeria
Background Information: Nigeria is a maritime nation in West Africa with a
population of 133 million people. It is the second largest economy in the SubSaharan region after South Africa and is the tenth largest producer of crude oil with
vast reserves of natural gas. Nigeria major trading partners and interests are the
United States, France, India, United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and Brazil. Its major
exports include crude oil, natural gas, cocoa, rubber, timber and its imports include
petroleum products, food machinery and equipment and manufactured goods. It is a
party to LOSC 82 and other important maritime conventions adopted by IMO. The
major ports are Port Harcourt, Bonny, Apapa, and Calabar ports. The maritime
matters are dealt by Nigerian Maritime Administration (NMA) and it has a maritime
safety administration for regulatory matters related to shipping. The work of NMA
includes implementation of IMO conventions, STCW issues and training. Nigeria is

4

The layered security measures by US include offshore, in transit and US waters security measure
which explained in detail in chapter 5
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on the so-called white list and the process of domestication of IMO conventions is a
continuous and ongoing process.
Nigerian waters has been reported as most deadly in terms of piratical attacks
according to IMB and it stated that half of the 30 deaths recorded in pirate attacks
around the world between 01.01.2004 and 30.06.2004 occurred in Nigerian territorial
waters. In terms of the number of attacks, Nigeria ranked third with 13 attacks,
behind Indonesia (50) and the Malacca Straits (20). Analysts blame the proliferation
of weapons in the coastal oil-rich Niger Delta region where armed gangs trade stolen
crude and also perceive this as the primary reason for the increased incidence of
maritime piracy in the Nigerian waters. Nigeria has a Navy comprising 15,000
personnel, safeguarding 853 kilometers of its coastline and other maritime interests
under its jurisdiction.
The Nigerian Navy is involved in taking response measures relating to SUA 88
convention and the ISPS Code provisions
Analysis: Industry analysts like IMB state that decades of corruption and
mismanagement by successive Nigerian regimes has left the oil-rich Niger Delta one
of the most impoverished regions across the country. Massive unemployment is just
one of the manifestations with a myriad of knock-on effects. Lax port security and a
general lack of sophistication with regards off-coast resources have both fed into the
scale, scope and incidence of piracy in this part of Africa. The Nigerian Navy is
actively involved in responding to all the maritime security threats. Patrolling the
coastal waters in four ships donated by the U.S. Defense Department had impounded
more than 20 ships in the past year and arrested 90 people, including 37 foreigners,
accused of dealing in stolen crude oil. The security forces say that without their
crackdown on militia groups and other armed gangs in the Niger Delta over the past
year, the tally of piracy deaths would have been considerably higher.
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The Nigerian National Maritime Administration seeks the assistance of the Nigerian
Navy to address all security related issues. But it is often the case that the security
forces cannot respond adequately unless it has effective legislation, resources,
modern communication facilities and training. The security forces don’t have
dedicated organisation and security infrastructure to deal with merchant marine
security issues. The regional cooperation and exchange of information, which is very
vital for implementation of ISPS Code and SUA convention is hardly present.
Besides the Abuja MOU addressing port state control issues, there is another regional
organisation, which deals with the matters related to West African maritime issues. It
is the Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa (MOWCA) established in
May 1975, is Africa's only sub-regional body dedicated to providing a platform for
handling all maritime matters common to its member states. Nigeria is a founding
member. The matters handled by MOWCA cover the cost-effectiveness of the supply
and demand for shipping services in the sub-region as well as maritime safety and
environmental protection issues. Its project include sub-regional Coast Guard
network and cooperation for combating piracy, enhancing maritime security and
implementation of SUA convention and ISPS Code. The progress is being in
coordination with IMO to address the issues as stated above.
Nigerian is a party to all IMO adopted security related conventions and ISPS code.
However, it would be safe to assume that unless there is an effective organisation
backed by strong legislation and enforcement powers, the situation in Nigeria is
likely to remain the same and Nigerian Navy should be supported by all means to
establish control over their waters by providing resources and other support by the
Government and the international organisations and other developed countries
having an interest in trade with Nigeria.
4.1.3 Lithuania
Background Information: Lithuania is a developing maritime nation with a
population of 3.2 million people and situated on the south east of Baltic Sea and has
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a coastline of 99 kilometers of which only 24 miles face the open Baltic Sea. Major
ports are Butinge, Kaunas, Klaipeda and as on 01 Jun 2004 it has 51 merchant ships
on its register of over 1,000 gross tons aggregating 3,28,000 DWT. Lithuania has
gained membership in the World Trade Organization and has joined EU in May this
year and has privatised the large state-owned utilities, particularly in the energy
sector. Foreign government and business support have helped in the transition from
the old command economy to a market economy. Trading partners are UK Russia,
Latvia, Germany and Poland and chief exports are mineral products, textiles,
machinery, chemicals, wood and wood pulp and foodstuffs and the imports are
machinery, transport equipment chemicals and metals.
The need for Maritime Safety Administration in Lithuania was felt in the end of
1995, when Lithuania joined the International Maritime Organization and became its
154th member. Lithuanian Maritime Safety Administration, an independent maritime
state institution, is responsible for the implementation of the compliance with the
provisions of laws and other legal acts affecting the safety and security of the
Republic of Lithuania.
Analysis: As the country has become independent as recently as 1991, their maritime
security set up is adequate when considering the threat level, the assured support
from NATO, size of their coastline. The 600-man navy uses patrol boats and former
Russian corvettes for coastal surveillance. With its security guaranteed through
NATO, Lithuania is creating a military that focuses more on contributing to
international operations, rather than territorial defence. It has a Coast Guard under
the Interior Ministry's supervision and is responsible for border protection, passport
and customs duties, and share responsibility with the navy for anti-smuggling and
drug interdiction (US Department of State, 2004, Background Note on Lithuania)
But threats do exist as Lithuania is considered as transhipment point for opiates and
other illicit drugs from Southwest Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe to
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Western Europe and Scandinavia (2003 CIA World Fact Book). But it is an internal
problem with a maritime strain and can be addressed effectively by the government
with support from the security forces. There are no perceived threats of piracy, armed
robbery or terrorist acts. As Lithuania being a member of European Community, they
are bound by all stringent maritime measures adopted by the European council.
Regulation EC No 725/2004 of the European Parliament and the council of 31 March
2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security has been incorporated into
Lithuania national legislation by Order No. 3-56 concerning the implementation of
ISPS Code requirements. Hence it can be stated that due to layered legal regimes
from EU to National to maritime administration to Coast Guard, the maritime
security regime is very effective and Lithuania is considered to be ready to meet all
the security challenges at sea.
4.1.4 India
Background Information: India is a maritime nation having 1.1 billion population
and has a coastline of 7,500 km covering Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea
and Indian Ocean.

It has an exclusive economic zone of 2.2 million square

kilometers and has major shipping lane across which more than 70,000 ships cross
the Indian waters annually and majority of those ships include those carrying the
entire crude oil shipments to Japan and East Asia. India's economy encompasses
traditional village farming, modern agriculture, handicrafts, fisheries, wide range of
modern industries, and a multitude of support services. The chief exports include
textile goods, gems and jewellery, engineering goods, chemicals, leather
manufactures, software and the imports are crude oil, machinery, gems, fertilizer,
and chemicals and its major trading partners US, UK Germany, Japan and Belgium.
India has 12 major ports and more than 300 intermediate and minor ports. It has over
305 ships of over 1,000 gross tons in its registry aggregating 9.16 million DWT.
Estimates indicate that close to about 80% of the international seaborne trade by
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volume is carried by ships and its major ports handle more than 280 million tonnes of
traffic every year. Hence, India is very much reliant on the seas. The Directorate
General of Shipping is an attached office of the Ministry of Shipping, Govt. of India
and deals with all executive matters, relating to merchant shipping like matters
concerning the maritime administration, maritime education and training,
development of shipping industry and other related subjects.
Most of the major industries in the country are situated in close proximity to the
various port localities. India has vital offshore assets, particularly oil and natural gas
assets as a result of an ambitious exploration and production strategy that have
involved an enormous amount of investment and are also vital to India’s energy
security. There are various types of threats to these offshore assets not only from
other states but also from non-state actors in the form of maritime terrorism. The
maritime threats include piracy and armed robbery. The IMB Report 20035, indicates
the port of Chennai as piracy prone. India has got nearly twenty-two neighbours
across the sea and beside communalism and religious fundamentalism, there exists a
plethora of maritime threats that can cause serious damage to the ports, shipping
sector and to the general economy. This paper is not delving deep into the facets of
maritime threats that India is experiencing due to the limited scope of discussion in
this chapter.
4.2

Case Study: Indian Maritime Security

Prior to UNCLOS III, Indian Navy dealt all issues related to seas. In 1979 there was
a felt need for examining the possibility of establishing a new institutional structure
for looking after all matters relating to the sea. There were two reasons for this. In
1976 the Maritime Zones Act had been promulgated whereby a territorial sea of 12
nautical miles, a contiguous zone of 24 nautical miles and exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) of 200 nautical miles, from the baseline had been established and second is the
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proliferation of sea- smuggling and poaching activities and non existence of one
central organisation coordinating all matters relating to sea. The Coast Guard was
set up in 1977 to address the issues arising from the Maritime Zones Act and to carry
out peacetime roles regarding anti-smuggling, search and rescue, assistance to
fishermen, pollution response, scientific research assistance and maritime security.
The Indian Navy previously addressed these issues, but it was found not cost
effective and it would undermine the warship readiness and preparedness.
Coast Guard personnel are trained with the Navy and there is no specialised training
provided to the CG personnel with the matters pertaining the safety and commercial
operations of the merchant marine.

The CG operates three Maritime Rescue

Coordination centres (MRCC), through which it receives both distress alerts and
piracy alerts. India is a party to SUA convention and CG has been entrusted to carry
out the required roles when the situation arises and it has no powers vested in it to
address issues relating to the ISPS code. Hence, it is observed that some issues in the
maritime security area are addressed by CG and other ISPS related maritime security
issues is dealt by the Directorate General of Shipping in India. There is no existing
machinery or agreements to deal with the security situations unless it impinges on the
national security.

The maritime departments deal with the control measures in

accordance to SOLAS Chapter XI-2/9. Nevertheless, the Coast Guard has always
endeavoured to respond to all security situations at sea, regardless of its status or
powers vested in it by careful situational analysis and support from national and
international organisations dealing with shipping. It is pertinent to mention a few of
the security related incidents which occurred in Indian waters and resulted in
apprehending one pirated vessel, one phantom vessel involved in drug smuggling,
one vessel involved in gun running and another one involved in stowaway issues.
The events are not very spectacular but it provides valuable insight to the legal

5

As per IMB statistics, out of 445 incidents reported worldwide, India accounts for 27 cases, nine of
them are from Chennai.
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issues, security infrastructure, the importance of cooperation and other important
lessons in maritime security.
4.2.1 MV Medstar - Stowaway Issue ( Source: Indian Express June 14 2000)
The Indian Coast Guard received a alert from Kandla Port Authorities situated on the
west coast of India on 09.06.2000 that the vessel MV Medstar scheduled to arrive at
the port on 10.06.2000 has been hijacked by the stowaways comprising 10 Iranians
and 4 Iraqis and they have diverted the ship to proceed to a different port and claim
that they have a bomb onboard and threatened to use it if the ship did not obey their
orders. The ship while it was in international waters, some 100 miles west of the
Kandla port was intercepted by two Coast Guard vessels and was ordered to steer to
Indian waters. Meanwhile the owners negotiated with the stowaways and the ship
proceeded to Mumbai port under escort of the Coast Guard ships. On 12.06.2000 a
specialist team boarded the ship with bomb disposal squad and a thorough
rummaging was carried out and it was later found that there was no bomb onboard.
The stowaways were there after handled by the shipowners, P&I club, charterers,
UNHCR and other interested parties.
Analysis
Table 3. Analysis of Security incident of MV Medstar
a)

Was it a security situation

Yes,

b)

Did the flag state Jamaica request

No

coastal state for assistance
c)

Did the coast Guard have authority to

No

intercept at High seas
d)

The stowaways are more

What are the threats

in number (fourteen) and
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informed that they have
bombs and will use it to
further their cause.
e)

What

would

have

been

the The ship would have been
blown up at sea or could

consequences

have forced into some port
and caused much more
damage
f)

Did

Indian

authorities

have

any To some extent under

jurisdiction and enforcement authority SUA 88 convention, but
India was not an interested

over Medstar?

state and other national
laws did not provide any
legal support.

4.2.2 MV Gloria Kopp -Alleged phantom ship
(Source: The Hindu, Jan 25 2000, The Cargo letter 347)
MV KOBE Queen – I, also Gloria Kopp, a 1976 built 18,500 DWT vessel registered
in Panama was captured by the Indian Coast Guard on 24.12.1999 after a hot pursuit
in the high seas. The vessel had a cargo of 15,000 tons of finished steel worth US$ 5
Million loaded from Istanbul and scheduled to deliver the cargo at Rio Haina,
Dominican Republic in early August 1999. The vessel went incommunicado and
was later declared criminal and was sought by world governments. A global sea
chase had begun with US$ 100,000 reward posted for information leading to arrest of
the vessel. (Cargo letter 347)
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Many governments including the US Coast Guard Law enforcement Detachment
(LEDET), a dedicated drug enforcement wing, sought the vessel, as the master of the
Gloria Kopp was involved in drug running case on a different ship earlier. The
Indian Coast Guard after a short chase boarded the vessel and found the master dead
by hanging himself in his cabin. The ship did not have any valid documents and the
registration and other mandatory documents were also expired. The ship was
thereafter escorted to Chennai harbour and handed over the Customs and Narcotics
control bureau and the ship was thoroughly searched and found no signs of any drug
consignment. The crew consisting of 24 Ukrainians claimed that they are innocent
and knew nothing about the ships business and that they were not paid. The cargo
interests claimed the cargo and no ship-owner turned up to claim the ship, which was
sold through public auction at Chennai.
It is important to mention here, that the information about the chances of sighting
Gloria Kopp was provided privately by an insurance agent and the Coast Guard
apprehended the vessel on suspicion, that the vessel after giving a warning did not
stop and tried to proceed towards the international waters.
Analysis
Table 4. Analysis of Security incident of MV Gloria Kopp
a)

Was there a security

To an extent yes, as the ship is not

situation

supposed to be in Indian waters and a
general alert was already sounded for
the ship.

b) Did the Flag state request for In this instance, although the ship was
flying the flag of Panama, the ship’s

any assistance

papers were expired and assistance
was sought
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c) Did the law enforcement Yes, to an extent that the ship was not
authorities have jurisdiction on innocent passage as it was found
anchored at a desolate location and

to board the vessel

tried to run away when encountered
by coast guard.
d) What other illegal matters The ships master was found dead
while it was in Indian waters, the crew

found against the ship

did not know about the shipowners or
the charterers. The documents were
not valid.
e) What charges were made Nil, as there are no provisions in the
national legislation to arrest the ship.

against the ship

The ship was brought to Chennai port
for rummaging, and the competent
court thereafter arrested it when the
cargo owner filed charges at Chennai
court.
f)

What was the involvement of Initially they had no clue about the
incident and there after, detained the

maritime administration

vessel for un-seaworthiness.

4.2.3 MV Alondra Rainbow- Pirated Vessel
(Source: ICC- IMB-piracy and maritime violence,
a global update, maritime security symposium at WMU, 2002 pp 12-14)
The Indian Coast Guard apprehended the Alondro Rainbow, an incident, which is
well known to everyone in the maritime field, in Nov 1999 through coordinated
efforts from IMB Piracy reporting centre at Kuala Lumpur. The pirated vessel
initially sighted at 70 nm on the west coast of India was finally caught at high seas
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approximately 300 nm from Mumbai after a hot pursuit of 30 hours. The 15 member
Indonesian crew was later arrested and was jailed in Mumbai prison and it took a
while to make a charge sheet against the alleged offenders.

It is notable that

although India is a party to UNCLOS, the piracy provisions were not incorporated
into national legislation. The all-encompassing Indian Penal Code did not address the
offence of piracy or hijacking of ships. Furthermore, at the time of arrest of the
alleged pirates, India was not a party to the SUA convention either. The only
alternatives left, which was revealed much later by the experts was the provision
under the 1861 Indian Admiralty Act and under Indian Law of notion of jure
gentium, i.e. offence against all nations, the pirates could be prosecuted in any
competent courts in India.
Analysis
Table 5. Analysis of Security incident of MV Alondra Rainbow
a) Was there a security situation

No, it was only a general alert given
by IMB.

b) Did the Flag state request for In this instance, the IMB representing
shipowners and the Flag interest

any assistance

coordinated with coast guard for
apprehension.
c) Did

the

law

enforcement Initially No, as it was not certain

authorities have jurisdiction whether the vessel was pirated or not
and the vessel was operating in the

to board the vessel

Indian EEZ. But under UNCLOS and
under law of jure gentium, the Indian
Coast Guard was in a position to
apprehend the vessel at high seas.
d) What charges were made Many charges under Indian penal

65

code from theft to criminal attacks on

against the ship

crews

4.2.4 Al Murtada – Alleged gun running ship?
(Source: Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 10 July 2002)
MV Al Murtada, a Lebanese registered 70 meter general cargo vessel was found
adrift in the Indian waters and was later boarded by the Indian Coast Guard and
found the ship abandoned with two AK-47 assault rifles along with 74 live
cartridges. The ship was entirely ransacked and did not have any navigation or
communication equipment. On extended search and analysis it was found that the
ship was hijacked by the Somali warlords in March 2002 and was kept as ransom and
later the crew of the ship overpowered the Somali militiamen and set sail towards the
Gulf. The ship ran out of fuel and water and thereafter was adrift for weeks and their
distress calls were responded by US Naval ship JF Kennedy and the crew was
rescued and placed onboard MV Stolt Spray, which was proceeding, towards Indian
port Kandla. The crew was disembarked at the Indian port and was later repatriated
to respective countries as seaman in distress. The crew consisted of two Lebanese,
four Syrians, six Somalis and four Indians. No crew member had any valid papers or
documents to prove themselves as seamen and after prolonged interrogation of the
Indian crew it was revealed that the repatriated person include two Somali
militiamen also.
Analysis
Table 6. Analysis of Security incident of Al Murtada
a) Was there a security situation
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To an extent yes, as the abandoned

ship was found with guns and live
cartridges.
b) Did the Flag state request for No
any assistance
c) Did

the

law

enforcement Yes, the vessel was not under

authorities had jurisdiction to command and is a ghost ship,
which posed danger to navigation

board the vessel

in the Indian territorial waters.
d) What

illegal

matters the ship was found totally un-

found against the ship

seaworthy and did not have IMO

other

number and its name cannot be
traced to any register.

It may be seen from all of the above incidents, that the Coast Guard did respond
effectively but in certain cases, it did not have the necessary mandate to respond due
to jurisdictional issues and it is a known fact that how an ill conceived operations by
a law enforcement agency, without proper training and information can lead a
government to the International Tribunal of the law of the Sea (ITLOS). A case in
point would be the unfortunate experience encountered by the Republic of Guinea
who have been charged for the violation of the UNCLOS provisions and were made
accountable to pay compensatory damages to the fishing vessel SAIGA belonging
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The Indian Coast Guard has been fortunate not
being caught on the wrong side of the fence and in these days of tussle between
sovereignty and jurisdiction rights of the coastal or port states versus the right to
navigation of the ships, the law enforcement agencies have to be doubly sure and be
within their rights to board a ship at sea for verifying any violations of their laws or
else, starting from the UNCLOS to all other international agreements are loaded with
provisions for payment of damages if the action of any law enforcement agency
proves to be wrong.
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4.3

Security Models and deficiencies

On analysis of all the four cases which occurred in the Indian waters and also from
the answers received from the selected developing maritime nations, it can be
observed that responses for tackling maritime security issues cover the entire
spectrum. From one end there is a clearly defined security regime, with regional
control like that of EU. On the other end the security aspects are dealt by the Navy
like that of Nigeria. In most of the cases there is a clear indication that different
security models are being followed and many occasions. The procedures are
randomly applied and also most of them maintain a law enforcement agencies at sea
for multifarious role and maritime security situation is addressed as the situation
develops. Though all the four countries are party to the IMO conventions dealing
with maritime security, the implementation level is dependent on the national will
and the maritime administration’s ability to coordinate efforts within its defined
parameters of the bureaucratic system that is being followed. The lack of basic
resources like communication is clearly evident in some cases and so is the effective
regional system for information exchange. While IMO does not have much mandate
to oversee its implementation of its convention, the regional systems like that of
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), MOWCA and ROCRAM has been effective to
somewhat addressing the issues of preventive action for piracy and armed robbery. It
can also be seen that all of the developing countries discussed above are dependent
upon transportation of oil as import and export and the oil movement has a
fundamental and vital importance to their energy security and to the overall
economic and trade growth of these countries and it is also well known how
vulnerable the ships and ports can be when criminal would utilize the tanker or
storage facilities to his advantage, however nefarious these might be.
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From the inferences drawn from the trading partners of these selected states, all of
them have significant trading relations with United States, United Kingdom and
other EU and OECD countries which have adopted strict maritime security measures
and will expect the ships and cargo arriving from these developing countries to be
safe from security lapses. Those developed countries will not refrain to term the ports
and ships “blacklisted” from security point of view, even for minor lapses like
ineffective ship security alarm systems, for carrying stowaways without their
knowledge or not updating the continuous synopsis record (CSR) etc.
With the coming into force of the ISPS Code there is a much greater general
awareness amongst the major players of the maritime industry and the maritime
administration on the aspect of maritime security issues. The member states in
accordance to the requirement of the SOLAS Chapter XI-2, regulation 13, regarding
communication of information has forwarded their detailed information to IMO and
a closer look at this information reveals the administrative setup and the response
system envisaged by the respective member states.
Take for example of India, wherein there is a already existing response organization
for maritime emergency the Coast Guard with its three Maritime Rescue
Coordination Centers acting as alert receiving post has not been dovetailed into the
requirement of ISPS Response system. The table 7 obtained from GISIS gives a clear
example of how one person is nominated to coordinate all the requirement of ISPS
Code. This is not a dig at the capability of that person or of his office, but it just
reflects the state of affairs where sharing of legal powers leads to more dilution of
authority. With more than 100,000 ship passages in the Indian coastal waters and
20,000 ship visits to the major ports annually, can a administrative organ without the
necessary security background deal with any emerging situation, perhaps it needs a
major security incident to shake up the system.
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Table 7. Global Integrated Ship Information system on India
(Source: IMO website http://www2.imo.org/ISPSCode/ISPSInformation.aspx)

ID

organisation first
name

name

contact
surname country
name

Directorate Man
General

of Mohan

Saggi

India

simlar

responsible
port

edit view delete

for

facility

add
similar

edit view delete

security

The

National

Directorate Man
General

name

authorities

Shipping
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type add

National
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355
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India

Shipping

authorities
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responsible

for similar

edit view delete

ship security
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751
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4.4

International efforts and its standing

Though IMO adopted many conventions and resolutions to address the security
situations, it can be observed that the measures recommended and actions envisaged
in most cases, are not residing in the right organization in the right place and in right
time so as to respond to the emerging security situations correctly and adequately.
These are just minimum measures and as can be seen from the efforts made by the
Chilean and Lithuanian authorities, the maritime security has been accorded high
priority even though those countries don’t face serious security threats to their ships
and in their ports.
From the piracy point of view, the efficacy of anti-piracy efforts is shaped by the
international institutional context. There exists many regional associations and
private international organization like IMB and it has aided in attracting considerable
attention from the governments, military experts and the media. At a regional level,
in the Caribbean Region, Dutch, French, American and British, Venezuelan naval
and coast guard vessels are working together to confront drug trafficking and piracy.
A similar regional effort to combat piracy is underway in South China Sea under
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Joint patrols of the Coastguards of Japan, India,
South Korea and Malaysia were instituted following an Anti-Piracy Conference in
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Tokyo in 2000. But the flip side is that the problems related to the provision of
maritime security by a third country and the territorial integrity do not go hand in
hand. The US initiative to position the Pacific Command Forces in the Malacca
Straits was fiercely opposed by Malaysia and caused considerable angst and unease
in the region for cooperation between US and the ASEAN nations.
For tackling effectively the terrorism and other maritime security issues, maritime
industry associations and national administrations are backing the ISPS Code
provisions and other regulations under SOLAS Chapter-XI-2 and there are no
regional associations which have sprung up for countering maritime terrorism except
the associations involved in anti-piracy programs which have include maritime
terrorism in their agendas. But certain states’ law enforcement agencies under strict
provisions of their national acts established on the lines of ISPS Code intends to
board ships at sea for example, the United States Coast Guard says it intends to board
every ship that does not comply with the rules on its first entry to an American port
from July 1st 2004. This will be quite some task, given that there are 60,000 calls at
American ports each year by ocean-going ships. With NATO’s credibility
undermined by its member countries’ differences over Iraq and their failure to
provide adequate troops to pacify Afghanistan, the alliance’s leaders are keen to
demonstrate that NATO still has a valuable role to play in the 21st century. The coordination of international anti-terrorism efforts should be part of that role. NATO
has already begun joint anti-terrorism naval patrols in the Mediterranean Sea
including the boarding of suspect vessels and escorting vulnerable shipping through
the Gibraltar straits. (The Economist Aug 2004, Global Agenda). America is also
pressing other countries to sign up to its container-security initiative, launched four
months after the 2001 September 11th attacks. Other issues involve supporting the
work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of the US- EU agreement on all
issues regarding the financing of terrorism.
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Hence, it can be seen that the anti- terrorism efforts in the maritime domain is mainly
a initiative of the US and EU led forces and it remains to be seen that whether their
prescriptions to counter terrorism will become a uniform standard in the days to
come, but it involves cost and proper coordination from the organisation which has
global mandate and that is IMO. Having seen the maritime security regime of the
developing countries in this chapter, it is imperative to take a look at the higher end
of the spectrum of counter terrorism initiatives and security infrastructure and to
analyse its effects on global maritime security. This analysis is provided in the next
chapter.

73

CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
5.1

What constitutes Maritime Security?

After analysing the legal regimes and the maritime security initiatives and its
effectiveness, adequacy and sufficiency in the previous chapters, this chapter intends
to characterise the maritime security perspectives from the point of view of the
maritime security analyst or interpreter and bring out the pros and con of the present
maritime security regimes. Maritime security can be defined as those measures
employed by owners, operators and administrators of vessels, port facilities, offshore
installations and other maritime organisations or establishments to protect against
seizure, sabotage, piracy, pilferage, annoyance or surprise of their assets both
movable and immovable, properties, operations, lives etc (Mejia, 2002, pp28). It can
be considered as embracing all measures taken to prevent hostile interference with
lawful operations. The purpose of maritime security is to make access to the target so
difficult so as to discourage the attempt, if attempted, minimise the damages. Factors
affecting the degree and type of security required by any ship or any facility depends
upon the size of the area, the nature and sensitivity, the mission for the law
enforcement agencies in that area, the vulnerability of the area, the economic and
political situations, the proximity of external support and the capabilities of potential
attackers. Proper maritime security creates a condition, which establishes and
maintains certain protective and preventive measures. These protective measures
which may vary in its application in different states and regions, must be capable of
all instances of performing two important tasks that is timely and accurate warning of
an impending threat and the response for removing or neutralising that threat by
repelling, capturing or eliminating the perpetrators (Hawkes, 1989, p09).
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The threats to shipping are comparatively a new development and many developing
countries has not faced any real threats. Hence there are hardly any measures taken
for providing adequate warning. For example, Nigeria does not have modern
communication facility to exchange security information and other developing
countries have not established any local or regional network for exchanging warning
information. For timely reaction they have always kept their faith on their
overburdened Navy, Coast Guard or police to react. Adequate warning and timely
reaction are achieved only through proper security awareness training to the crew
and the personnel concerned. This calls for awareness of security for their ships, in
the ports, in their internal waters and territorial seas and waters beyond. Awareness
and knowledge can only be gained through proper indoctrination and training, which
is the function of enlightened security management. It may happen that due to the
prohibitively high cost of physical protective measures, in terms of money and
manpower, maximum security may not be achieved under all circumstances.
However, the specific areas of vulnerability must therefore be determined and
resources apportioned accordingly for providing, at least, timely and accurate
warning to ships and to its port and to establish minimum response measures within
the high-risk area.
Without adequate warning the best security force may fail to protect its interest and
conversely, without the ability to respond, the adequate warning is useless.
Adequate warning and are addressed through the provisions of regulation 3 of
SOLAS 74 Chapter XI-2, instructing administration to set security level and ensuring
that the security level information is passed to the ships that fly their flags and also to
set security levels to port facilities and to ships that is entering the port or whilst it is
in the territorial waters of that port state. Information as to how the administration is
going to set the security levels and what are the criteria are not clearly mentioned.
The guidance provisions provided in the Part B of the ISPS Code (Section 4.8,
setting the security level) is very sketchy in this regard. This would effectively mean
that the means to obtain the protective measures for maritime security viz. the
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accurate warning has not been addressed and it is left for the national administration
to fend for themselves. Some private companies displaying opportunistic
entrepreneurial zest has entered the fray and are offering solutions for bridging the
lacunae through Internet like SeeThreat1 etc.
The second pillar of protective measure is the ability to respond and it is entirely
left to the member states to take measures as they deem fit. Many states have
institutionalised the maritime security response measures by authorising the law
enforcement agencies to react to emerging situations and they are trained
accordingly. In some cases, the states just wait for incident to occur and then seek the
assistance from the law enforcement agencies for responding to that incident. In an
approach like this, several questions and issues abound and remain unanswered such
as can a shipmaster be assured, that the impending threat will be responded in all
cases when he is not sure what to look for and when the help will arrive even after
making SSAS alerts in accordance to the regulations. It depends on which area and
which jurisdiction he is seeking help. The variations are aplenty.
5.2

Maritime security regimes in developed countries

In addition to the security measures envisaged for the maritime transportation and
port facility security by the IMO, there exists a number of security measures all
around the world which are taken unilaterally but do complement the IMO measures
to a certain extent. These other additional extreme measures taken by the developed
States cannot be set aside unless the other developing state does not want to trade in
that region. Just as how Oil Pollution Act 1990 of the United States had its
tremendous and all pervasive effect on shipping, the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA) 2002 is having a much more deeper and significant impact on
the shipping industry. The new concept of the United States Maritime Security
1

SeeThreat, a new web-based risk assessment tool launched by Lloyd’s Register, which helps ship
operators and their company security officers (CSO) to assess the security threat to their ships. It
constantly monitors maritime security news information for locations and threats specified by the
operator to meet its own needs and the relevant ISPS Code threat levels.
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programme is to keep the threat away from its shores and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) which has the maritime security mandate merge the
various maritime security aspects under one integrated system for the capability to
anticipate, pre-empt and deter threats to its ships, ports or its coasts whenever
possible, and the ability to respond quickly when such threats do materialize.
The new maritime security measures, envisages to build upon the layers of security
that are already in place at the US ports. The US Coast Guard is the implementation
and overseeing authority for the maritime security measures across the US. By taking
a layered approach to security, the DHS has utilized the expertise of other agencies
like Customs and Border protection, the private sector and state and local authorities,
to create a system of different security measures that ensure that there are protective
measures in place from one end of the sea based journey to the other. The layered
security measures are designed to protect the three phases of the journey: overseas,
in transit, and on the US shores as elucidated in the figure 1.
Figure 1. Three layers of US Maritime Security programme
(Source: Department of Homeland Security- redrawn by author)

Overseas

In transit
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US Shores

For example if the ship leaves from Singapore and is destined towards a US west
coast port, then it undergoes three phases of security regime, starting even before the
cargo has been loaded at Singapore port. It is important to examine the details of the
security, so as to analyse the impacts of this security on the world shipping and on
the other security regimes followed by the world in general.
5.2.1 OVERSEAS STRATEGY OF THE DHS
♦

24- Hour Advanced Manifest Rule Security measure: Awareness: All sea
carriers with the exception of approved bulk carriers are required to provide
proper cargo description and valid consignee address 24 hours before cargo is
loaded at the foreign port for shipment to the United States through the Sea
Automated Manifest System. Failure to meet the 24-hour advanced manifest
rule results in a “do not load” message and other penalties.

♦

Container Security Initiative (CSI) Security Measure: Awareness and
Prevention: Under the CSI program, the screening of containers are
accomplished by a team of US customs and Border protection in concert with
host nation counterparts. So far 18 countries have joined CSI. Through CSI,
potential suspect containers are targeted and identified before being loaded
onto vessels.

♦

Customs–Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) Security
Measure: Awareness and Prevention: Customs- Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a joint government-business initiative to build
cooperative relationships that strengthen overall supply chain and border
security. Through the C–TPAT, many importers, carriers, brokers,
forwarders, and buyers and sellers and manufacturers take necessary steps to
secure their supply chains.
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♦

International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code Security Measure:
Awareness and Prevention: On July 1, 2004, member states of IMO around
the world have implemented the first International Ship and Port Security
standard ever created. As discussed earlier, the ISPS Code establishes a
standard for security and requires governments, port authorities, companies
and ships to take certain responsibilities for preventive and risk reducing
measures. The ISPS Code is just a small part of the overall security measure
taken by the US.

♦

International Port Security Program - Security Measure: Awareness and
Prevention: Under this effort, the US Coast Guard and the host nation will
work jointly to evaluate the countries overall compliance with the ISPS Code.
USCG intends to work at least with 45 countries every year apart from
positioning international port security liaison officer at important ports to
share information on best practices and provide assistance to the travelling
team.

♦

Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) – Security Measure: Awareness and
Prevention: This program will analyze the security in the commercial supply
chain and tests solutions to close security gaps. Technologies are available to
enhance maritime and cargo security, to protect global supply chain and
facilitate the flow of commerce.

5.2.2 IN TRANSIT - STRATEGY
♦

Smart Box Initiative- Security Measure Prevention: It is an effort by CSI
for identifying “tamper evident” containers. It is the Smart Box coupled to an
internationally approved mechanical seal affixed to an alternate location on
the container door with an electronic container security device designed to
deter and detect tampering of the container door.
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♦

Ship Security Alert System – Security Measure Response: SSAS enables a
vessel to send a covert alert to shore for incidents involving acts of violence,
indicating the security of the ship is under threat or has been compromised.
The SOLAS Chapter -XI/6 requires that all ships to be fitted with SSAS by
July 1, 2004.

♦

Automated Targeting System – Security Measure Awareness: Automated
Targeting System serves as a main tool for performing transnational risk
assessment and evaluating potential national security risks posed by the cargo
and passengers arriving by sea, air, truck and rail. Using pre-arrival and
intelligence input, this rules-based system identifies high risks targets before
they arrive in the US.

♦

96- Hour Advance Notice of Arrival - Security Measure Awareness and
Prevention: Ships must notify United States Coast Guard (USCG) 96 hours
before arriving on a US port and provide detailed information on the crew,
passenger, cargo and voyage history. This information is analyzed using the
databases and intelligence information. Part of the analysis involves
identifying of previous security related problems in the previous port of calls.
US Coast Guard will thereafter determine what course of action to be taken,
including boarding at high seas or providing escort to and from the port.

5.2.3 STRATEGY IN US WATER AND ON US SHORES
♦

National Targeting Centre (NTC) – Security Measure Prevention and
Response: The main mission of the NTC is to provide tactical targeting and
analytical research support for Customs and Border Protection anti-terrorism
efforts. NTC will operate around the clock and utilize tools like Automated
Targeting System (ATS). The NTC also supports operations in the field
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including the Container Security Initiative (CSI) personnel stationed at
critical foreign ports throughout the world.
♦

Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centre - Security Measure Prevention:
Before any vessels is allowed to enter port, all vessels are screened for the
security risk they pose to the US based on the information about the vessel’s
cargo, security history and any intelligence information. Those identified as
higher risk are targeted for offshore boarding to ensure potential security
issues are addressed prior entry into ports. In addition USCG randomly
selects vessels for security boarding to ensure an element of unpredictability
and thus deterrence.

♦

Operation Port Shield - Security Measure Prevention: Operation Port
Shield focuses on the implementation and enforcement of the new security
measures implemented under the MTSA 2002. Under this verification
program, the Coast Guard will be boarding every vessel, at sea or at the dock,
on its first visit to a US port to ensure that the vessel comply with the US
security requirements.

♦

Automatic Identification System - Security Measure Awareness: AIS is a
vessel tracking equipment that automatically sends detailed information to
other ships and shore based agencies principally to aid navigation and
simultaneously for vessel tracking and monitoring, increasing security and
safety in the shipping channels.

♦

Area Maritime Security Committee – Security Measure Awareness,
prevention and Response: The USCG has established committees in all the
nation’s ports to coordinate activities of all stakeholders, including federal,
state and local government agencies and industry and the boating public.
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♦

Other onshore measures include:
•

Port Security Assessment program - Awareness

•

Port Security Grants – Awareness, Prevention and Response

•

Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology- Prevention

•

Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) – Prevention and Response

•

Guarding In-Between the Ports – Prevention

•

Operation Dry-dock – Awareness and Prevention

•

Transportation Workers Identity Card (TWIC) – Awareness and
Prevention

5.2.4 Initiative by other developed states
Usually, the other maritime security initiatives taken by any state generally involve
following some of the US initiatives mentioned above. For example, presently there
are about 18 countries, which have signed a pact for the CSI and it covers 22 largest
ports of the world, including four EU Member States against the wishes of the EU.
(DHS, 2004). In fact, the European Union has dropped legal action against four
Member States that broke rank by signing the bilateral maritime security deals with
the United States to fight terrorism, in April this year after European Union reached
its own agreement with the United States on container security. Another security
measure, which attracted much participation from the US national and other
international trading companies, is the Customs - Trade Partnership Against
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Terrorism (C-TPAT). So far about 5,700 companies have submitted the application
for their consent to participate in the programme.
The EU proposals extended the ISPS Code requirements to Class A passenger
vessels which are engaged in domestic voyages that travel more than 20 nautical
miles from the port and also to all vessels of 500 Gross tons engaged in domestic
voyages to have Ship Security Plan and make number of ISPS Code part B
provisions as mandatory requirement to their vessels. It also proposes to exempt the
control provisions to the vessels engaged in trade activities between the member
states, which cuts across the IMO requirements. The major aspect of the proposals is
to maintain the security regime amongst the member state’s vessel through a
inspection role through European Maritime Safety Authority (EMSA).
5.2.5 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): The Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) is another response to the ever-growing challenge posed by the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials
worldwide. Under the Law of the Sea Convention, PSI allies are only allowed to
board and inspect a vessel in the high seas with the agreement of the state under
whose flag it sails. Over half the world’s shipping sails under flags of convenience
and the US and other powerful countries are relying on PSI to board and prosecute
the ships which un-authorisedly carry WMD and other destructive materials. Panama
and Liberia have agreed to allow the those countries (10 countries in all namely
Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and
UK) that are part of the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to board ships
sailing under their flags in the high seas if they are suspected of carrying weapons of
mass destruction. The PSI was launched in May 2003 by the world’s major maritime
powers and so far 50 countries have taken steps towards joining the alliance.
Informatively, the revised protocol to the SUA convention has some part, which give
powers to the parties to take action similar to that of PSI measures. But PSI has
inherent risks, as it is not a normal security initiative and there is no UN
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authorisation or sanction. The actions of those maritime powers at high sea and the
consequent delay for ships could open another litigation strata for claiming damages
and prolonged deliberations at UN and many other international forums for
redressing issues which are not internationally governed.
5.3

IMO maritime security initiative and its adequacy

As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, IMO security initiatives were aimed predominantly
at providing preventive measures. The preamble to the ISPS Code states that, as
threat increases, the only logical counteraction is to reduce vulnerability. The Code’s
prescription for the reduction of vulnerability are the ship security assessment and
ships security plan (SSP), Port Facility security assessment and Port Facility Security
Plan (PFSP), appointment of Ship Security Officer, Company security officer,
Declaration of Security, setting Security Level, identity checks for the visitors of the
ship and port, cargo monitoring and access control and communications. The Ship
Security Plan is designed to ensure that the ship always operates at minimumsecurity level of security level 1 and so is the Port Facility Security Plan. The
security measures taken onboard ship will be checked at the international ports
through the control provisions but the there is no control provisions for the port
security measures taken by the port but only by their national authorities and the
ships have been given the choice to stick to the security level set by the port
authorities or to operate at a higher security level by making an agreement with the
PFSO for the Declaration of security. In light of the above provisions, there is an area
where the clash of interest is anticipated or is likely to have a negative impact.
While it is accepted that through the IMO adopted security measures, the necessary
preventive measures are put in place in both at ships and at port to reduce
vulnerability, it is essential to confirm whether the IMO adopted measures and other
similar measures will be able to provide a total solution of protective measures as
described in the earlier paragraph, that is the measure of adequate warning and the
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ability to respond. The protective measures provided in the SOLAS 74 are segregated
into two categories of warning and ability to respond and are tabulated below for
easy understanding.
Table 8. SOLAS 74 – Maritime Security Protective Measures
Information Gathering and Warning
Measures
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From the table 8 above, it can be observed that the items on the left for the warning
section are equipment based and are commercially available and the measures on the
response section are the possible courses of action a security forces is likely to take,
but they are not addressed in the IMO adopted resolutions. But the information to be
gathered and shared in accordance to the regulations of SOLAS CH XI-2 has security
connotations and the present communication infrastructure is open ended and
unsecured and can be accessed by anyone who is interested. How the international
community is going to address this situation is another area of concern. If it is
envisaged to use encryption methods and how are the maritime administration who
have taken the task of communicating the security information is going to involve
themselves and to what level is yet to be defined and ascertained.
The IMO has issued a MSC Circular 1073 in Jun , 2003 regarding the directives for
maritime rescue coordination centres (MRCC) on acts of violence against ships.
MRCC apart from being first point of contact for distress coordination and for
receiving alerts for piracy and armed robbery has extended the role of MRCC to
handle the ship security alerts for acts of violence and terrorism. The alert may be
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received directly by ships or through security forces authority (SFA)2, other MRCC
or other ships or agencies. The alerts may be overt or covert. MRCC should have
immediate access to call SFA for the operational application of countermeasures. If
the alert is outside the SRR relay the alert to the appropriate MRCC. Some MRCC
has shown reluctance to handle such messages and some shipping companies want
the message to be passed on to the coastal state’s Ministry of Defence and state of
affairs regarding how the member states have addressed the issue can be checked in
the IMO’s GISIS database. The SSAS alert reception centres varies from MRCC to
Military operation centres to Maritime Administration office.
Another handicap being faced is that how can a law enforcement agency expected to
respond in consonance with the ship security plan or port facility security plan when
they are made by civilian organization which may conflict with the military response
plan as the two organization may never have sat together to draw up the ship security
assessment or the ship security plan. Another important area of lacunae is when the
coastal state receives intelligence information that the ship poses an immediate threat
to the security or other scenarios where the contracting governments may take steps
outside the SOLAS Regulation XI-2/9 for national security or defense, even if the
ship is fully compliant with the ISPS code.
It is the considered opinion that all of the above lacunae can be addressed by the
contracting states if the national administration has sound national security policy or
other maritime security contingency plans and has some component of law
enforcement agencies or maritime security agency in their maritime security systems
and IMO should provide some broad, overall framework for achieving this aim.

2

IMO Circular MSC 1073 of 10 Jun 2003 defines Security Forces Authority (SFA) as an
organisation, national or regional command of a public agency such as Navy, Coast Guard or Police in
charge of providing the response to security incident.
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5.4

Initiatives by other organizations and agencies

The industry and the association involved in maritime transportation has taken many
initiatives for complementing security measures, and they are as follows
5.4.1 Seafarer’s Identity: Because of the unique character of seafaring,
most maritime countries have special laws and regulations covering this
occupation. Consequently, the International Labour Organisation ILO3,
since its founding, has had special "machinery" for seafarers. Since 1920,
the International Labour Conference has adopted over 60 maritime labour
standards. Seafarers standards cover a multitude of areas including
minimum age of entry to employment, recruitment and placement,
medical examination, articles of agreement, repatriation, holidays with
pay, social security, hours of work and rest periods, crew accommodation,
identity documents, occupational safety and health, welfare at sea and in
ports, continuity of employment, vocational training and certificates of
competency.

The most significant convention, which has maritime

security connotation, is the Seafarer’s Identity document. The earlier
convention regarding seafarer’s identity document was convention No.
108 which was adopted in 1958 and ratified by 61 countries. The
convention No 108 has been now replaced by new convention No.185
adopted in 2003 as Seafarer’s Identity Document Convention (SID). An
international labour standard designed to create a new biometric identity
verification system for the world's 1.2 million maritime workers has
received sufficient ratifications to go into force in February 2005. The
new identity document for seafarers allows for the use of a "biometric
template" to turn two fingerprints of a seafarer into an internationally
standardized 2-D barcode on the Seafarer's Identity Document. It has
3

The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the UN specialized agency which seeks the
promotion of social justice and internationally recognized human and labour rights. It was founded in
1919 and it became the first specialized agency of the UN in 1946.
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been hailed as a major step toward strengthening security measures on the
high seas and in the world's ports. At the same time, it is also designed to
ensure the rights and freedoms of maritime workers and facilitate
mobility in the exercise of their profession-for example when they board
their ships to work, take shore leave or return home.

But despite

acceptance by shipowners and seafarer’s unions, US authorities have
made it plain that it will be years before the technology will be considered
a workable alternative to visas. ( Lloyd’s List -31Aug 2004). The question
of seafarer’s shore leave at international ports has been addressed through
many forums including IMO ( ISPS Code preamble No.11), it may take a
while before better sense prevails. Meanwhile the new SID convention
gives governments, shipowners and seafarers the benefit of a reliable
system of identification and is a pioneering and sophiscated response to
the security concerns in the modern world, while safeguarding the
individual rights.

5.4.2 Threat Reports: Office of the Naval Intelligence (ONI) of the
United States Navy provides worldwide threats in their shipping report
every week and is disseminated through the World Wide Web.
The Maritime Security Council (MSC) is a another organisation that
works closely with United States and provide security related information
to member agencies concerned with commercial vessel security. It is the
principle clearinghouse for the exchange of information between its
members, and acts as liaison with regulators and governments providing
vital information and governments offering vital intelligence on crimes at
sea and in ports. Members are kept informed on international maritime
security news, issues, and events via the MSC's exclusive Maritime
Security Alert e-mail newsletter service, which provides timely
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information on such matters as hostile vessel seizures, incidents or reports
of piracy, and hazardous port conditions.
International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre located
at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia is a 24-hour information centre acting as the
focal point against acts of piracy and armed robbery and publishes weekly
piracy report and also provide daily piracy alerts to the ships operating in
vulnerable area through Inmarsat EGC Network.
The Lloyd's Register Group's new web service, SeeThreat, continually
scans the news network and provides you with specific maritime security
information so that you can make critical security decisions cost
effectively. SeeThreat filters this information for the locations and threat
levels one chooses.
5.4.3 Ship Security Alerts: There are many companies, which are
providing the Ships security Alert Systems (SSAS) solutions using
satellite technology and they include Inmarsat, and Iridium. Another
alerting device is the ShipLoc system, which provides permanent tracking
of the ship to its ship-owner in nominal mode, and provides immediate
alerts in case of panic button activation to the IMB, the ship-owner and to
the competent authorities. Since 1999, ShipLoc has successfully proven
its effectiveness several times in specific cases where hijacked ships were
recovered In case of an alert; information is provided simultaneously to
the IMB and to the competent authority, as well as to the ship owner.
5.4.4 Vessel surveillance through AIS: Automatic Identification System
besides providing valuable information on course speed and other
navigational details can also provide additional information regarding last
port of call, the next port of call, cargo carried etc. It is felt that the
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additional information can provide some security advantage for the
authorities, of whatever form, having access to this amount of detail.
Further, Vessel Traffic Systems (VTS) can interrogate any vessel
approaching ports and can inform the law enforcement agencies (rapid
action force) to deal with the ships not responding to VTS calls.
Paramilitary forces can search out suspect vessels on their own. Another
problem, which is being faced by many VTS Centres are transmission of
redundant data by ships with many ships failing to update the data, which
is being communicated. The downside of the AIS is the information,
which can be gathered by people with evil intent and can be used to
pinpoint their intended targets with deadly and precise accuracy with
disastrous consequences. To ameliorate this weakness, it is essential that
the critical data should be encrypted by internal software of the AIS
equipment and this encrypted data be allowed to be accessed by approved
authorities (Safety at Sea, Jul 2003, pp17).
5.4.5

Other international organizational efforts

OECD: The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development4
(OECD) had prepared its final report on Maritime Security during Jun
2004 titled Maritime Security - Ownership and Controls of Ships: Options
to Improve Transparency. The report suggests that the progress in
increasing transparency will require the co-operations of administrations
that may consider it appropriate, and commercially beneficial. The report
also provides a wide range of measure for the consideration of
administrations and of shipping registers that would make it more difficult
for terrorists and criminals to operate and it includes:
4

The OECD groups 30 member countries sharing a commitment to democratic government and the
market economy. With active relationships with some 70 other countries, NGOs and civil society, it
has a global reach. Best known for its publications and its statistics, its work covers economic and
social issues from macroeconomics, to trade, education, development and science and innovation
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•

Coordinated actions against jurisdiction that provide corporate
mechanisms that facilitate anonymity

•

Encourage flag states to address transparency of ownership

•

Target ships where beneficial ownership is obscure

•

Target ships from flag states that promote anonymity

•

Restrict access to ports only to flags and ships where
ownership and control is known

The Report concludes by suggesting a genuine and substantial move towards
greater transparency to reduce the burdens on security agencies and
governments charged with the protection of their citizens and their assets.
International Maritime Bureau (IMB): International Maritime Bureau, was
founded in 1981, by members consisting of shipowners, insurers and other
interested parties. IMB's task is to prevent fraud in international trade and
maritime transport, reduce the risk of piracy and assist law enforcement in
protecting crews. IMB combats all types of maritime and trade crime,
including documentary credit fraud, charter party fraud, cargo theft and the
deviation of ships. IMB's Regional Office situated in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia is also the home of the Piracy Reporting Centre, which responds
immediately to acts of piracy and collects evidence for law enforcement
agencies.
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INTERPOL: Interpol’s5 involvement in the fight against international
terrorism commenced in 1985 when a specialized group within the then
Police Division of Interpol Headquarters to 'co-ordinate and enhance cooperation in combating international terrorism' was created. The Public
Safety and Terrorism (PST) Sub-Directorate within the Interpol deals with
matters relating to Terrorism, Maritime Piracy and Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Interpol collects stores, analyses and exchanges information with
its 181 member countries through its secure global police messaging system.
Intelligence is shared about suspect individuals, groups and their activities.
Interpol co-ordinates the circulation of alerts and warnings by means of
specific tools such as its colour-coded international notices system. The
widest possible co-operation and exchange of information is made through
international and national coordination and the PST makes maximum use of
Interpol’s communication network and central record capability to ensures
that all information it receives is treated to maximize subsequent analyses or
responses to queries from member countries. In addition to the work done in
terrorism information management, it also maintains liaison with a number of
international organizations and organizes various symposia and working
groups for people involved in the fight against terrorism. It regularly
coordinates its activities with International organisations dealing maritime
piracy like IMB and Maritime Security Council.
In conclusion, it can be seen that the maritime security has been addressed in one
context universally through IMO for which the member states have made strenuous
and untiring efforts to comply uniformly, and the second set of maritime security
measures adopted are the ones which are initiated and prompted by the United States
which are very stringent and even the ISPS Code and its various provisions and
5

INTERPOL is a pre-eminent police organisation based at Paris coordinating with all organisations
and governments and other authorities to provide services relating to detecting, preventing and
suppressing international crimes
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measures just form one of the measures included in the enormous swathe of
measures being implemented. The third set of maritime security measures adopted is
the measures being addressed by the private international players and the commercial
vendors. It goes without saying that the protective measures envisaged for the
shipping industry is a combination of accurate information and ability to respond and
we have experienced firsthand the issues affecting the provisioning of accurate
information and its drawbacks and also the aspect of the ability to respond which
have been left entirely to the national authorities to decide in which form and
structure it wishes to adopt.
From the available information and by an astute analysis of the security systems of
the selected states in the previous chapter, it indicates a near even lack of uniformity
in the international maritime security response system and this no doubt will leave a
gaping hole for the unwanted elements to exploit causing untold damage not only to
the maritime industry but to the global way of life which we have over the centuries
sought to protect and maintain. The next chapter intends to propose few ideas, which
if implemented correctly would hopefully assist in the closing of the yawning gap
which exists in the maritime security landscape and endeavour an humble attempt in
contributing to the creation of a global maritime security system, which will be
effective and that one which can be easily implemented and maintained for the
betterment of shipping and maritime transportation as a whole.
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CHAPTER 6

MARITIME SECURITY ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY
6.1 Era based security policy
If we revisit the history of maritime security policies practiced over the last century it
had a clear and distinctive era characterized by the policies established by the world
maritime powers. The early part of the last century had been period of domination of
the sea and naval power was the deciding factor in the outcome, and that control of
seaborne commerce was critical to that domination. This led to two world wars. But
during the post World War II period, efforts were directed towards the establishment
of humanitarian law and the most important piece of legislation to come out was the
1949 Geneva Convention and their 1979 additional protocols. The role of naval
powers then changed to the requirement of that era and the centre of attention was to
protect their national territory and their political independence. Some states maintain
a naval presence to consolidate their friendship and cooperation with friendly and
allied countries, thus conforming the definition of naval presence as a tool of foreign
policy. A number of crises have been settled by timely naval manoeuvres. The
continuous deployment of naval forces can have a general stabilising effect in a
region. Similarly, the withdrawal of naval forces can be a confusing signal leading
to instability, as was demonstrated by the increase in piracy in South China Seas and
Malacca Straits region (Abhyankar, 2004).
During the discussions of the Law of the Sea Conference III in the early seventies,
the maritime community woke up to the new realities of protecting their Territorial
Sea, Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf and
eventually many countries formed their own Coast Guard or Maritime Police or
extended the peace time protective roles to the existing Navy and a more graduated
system of control over the use of force by governments was executed by means of
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Rules of Engagement. It is a formal process in which the detailed restraints on use of
force, and the circumstances within which it may be used by an operational
commander, are laid down. This formed another era where the security forces mainly
focussed on issues relating to EEZ, marine resources, smuggling, customs, fiscal
matters and immigration.
The present trend of globalization is often being described as the third wave of the
ongoing multi-dimensional process of trade utilizing the oceanic highway. Along
with the globalization, the risk of maritime threats of terrorism and piracy is
increasing as discussed and established in the earlier chapters. This has led to a
situation whereby application of security strategy established for peace time roles for
guarding natural resources and protecting the coasts earlier will not be in a position
or would be considered adequate enough or be able to respond to the current threats
effectively. In this context, it may be observed that the defensive measures adopted
so far by many countries have not deterred the attacks on commercial shipping in its
incidences nor in its severity. By and large, the measures adopted till now are
designed to discourage small-scale piracy and are not effective against the actions or
nefarious intents of determined pirates and terrorists. What the new era demands- is a
new set of rules and a new set of framework for the law enforcement agencies to
establish order and control of the sea.
There is an old adage which states that without force there is no enforcement. Since
the last several decades, the shipping and maritime community has addressed the
issue of security through the IMO, for establishing stringent national laws for piracy
and illegal acts against ships and to establish preventive and protective measures.
The shipping industry and the maritime community in general has responded
adequately to the requirements of taking all the necessary preventive measures and
the contracting members have responded well by making national legislation for
SUA 88 Convention and for the ISPS Code and new SOLAS provisions. However
the protective measure taken so far has not been uniform as discussed in the earlier
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chapters due to several constraints outlined. The role of government controlled law
enforcement agencies has been sidelined and a new breed of private maritime
security specialists have emerged and have become the mainstay in providing
security assessments to security training. In this context, it would be worthwhile to
take note of Professor Barnet’s (of the Naval War College, USA) statement i.e.,
‘globalization is splintering the concept of national security as also generating new
markets for both supra and sub national security providers’ which is very clear and
eloquent in describing the dichotomy that exists in the management of national
security issues.
In the developing country point of view, having a maritime force structure greatly
influenced by collective security requirements, most countries face the problem of
finding an answer to the vexing question of as to what form its maritime forces
should take in the future. Several interrelated issues are likely to dominate the
process through which developing countries should develop new maritime strategies
and force structures for the new era dominated by globalisation and terrorism. These
include
•

The use of maritime forces for coastal and high risk area security;

•

The restructuring of forces to address the growing threat of terrorism and
maritime violence at sea and integrated approach for dealing with SUA
related offences and ISPS Code security situation

•

The increasing significance of environmental and other non-military threats
to maritime security

•

Cooperative security: internationalism or regionalism

Many of the maritime security regimes are in a state of transition and it is but natural
to incorporate the maritime security forces in the mainstream maritime security
policies as governments control them. They can be multitasked, can be trained
effectively and can be made available at all times all round the year. But to put in
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place a maritime security policy there should be clearly defined national security
policy and needs a very high degree of top-level commitment and enhanced level of
interdepartmental coordination and cooperation. Maritime security issues are usually
an integral part of the broader national security picture, and must be considered as
part of the bigger picture. These issues are so closely intertwined that it is very
difficult to discuss them in isolation. The real and rising terrorist threats world over
has caused nations to carefully review and improve their national security
arrangements. There are certain basic conditions that make this a decisive time for
the future of maritime security policy, both its development and implementation.
There are Cabinet Committees and other Working Groups in place now to deal with
the response to the threat of terrorism. As such, maritime security policy
development cannot be looked at it in isolation. There are other national, bi-national
and international considerations, which must be part of the policy development.

It takes time to get policy right and governments cannot always be developing policy
only in reaction, and never in anticipation or proactively. Governments can ill afford
the luxury of the reactive policy making and implementation taking into
consideration the ramifications and the extremely high and expensive levels of real
and collateral damage that can result from inaction. As brought out in the preceding
chapter, some aspects of maritime security are highly technical or complex in nature.
Policy makers and decision makers must have informed, expert advice on how this
affects policy development and implementation. Above all, however, this thesis
argues in favour of a maritime security policy. Such a policy needs a firm and
committed government authority that can continue to assess, interpret, review and
guide key decisions in its development and implementation.
6.2

Maritime security enforcement strategy

Any security scheme entails permanent measures such as drawing up of strategic
plans, the designation of the responsible authorities and the installation of certain
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technologies, but it also includes variable provisions only implemented in the context
of sound risk management when the situation so justifies. Oftentimes, additional
measures take up the greatest amounts of resources for a developing nation against
the risks envisaged. These should therefore be properly justified. This approach
characterizes the measures adopted by the International Maritime Organisation. The
development of sound maritime security policies and designation of authority for
enforcement aided by sound maritime security management will without any doubt
incorporate the risk analysis methods and cost benefit analysis to implement the right
security strategy.
6.2.1 Designation of Security Forces Authority (SFA)
The designation of the Maritime Security Force Authority for dealing with all kinds
of security issues should consider the factors whether there is a force, which is both
an armed force in nature and a law enforcement agency. This is due to the fact that
the security challenge is made more difficult since terrorism and maritime violence
can neither be classified as either criminal act or an act resembling Low Intensity
Conflict (LIC) in other words act of war which needs military action. The security
enforcement authority having mandates will fit into the security strategy envisaged.
Most of the world’s Coast Guards have both mandates for both as law enforcement
agents as well as seagoing Armed Force. As such, they are appropriately positioned
to take over the responsibilities of the maritime security. Providing authority to
different security forces for dealing with different security situations will lead to
numerous command and control problems. It is also felt that the sudden insertion of a
security force into the civilian oriented maritime administration in many countries
will provoke a lot of debate and questions. This thesis is not recommending that
option but only suggesting that if there is an existing law enforcement agencies
having an armed force character like that of a Coast Guard or maritime police, they
will fit perfectly into the maritime security enforcement functions suitably. The
illustration as provided in the US Coast Guard’s Role in Homeland Security is
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adapted to provide the important information of how security situation demands the
civil and military mixture is provided in the figure 2 below.
Figure 2. Civil/ Military Mixture for addressing maritime security
( source: USCG National Maritime Security Strategy- adapted by author)
Figure: Civil Military mixture for addressing Maritime security Issues
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6.2.2 Maritime security strategy
Once the maritime security force authority is identified, the maritime strategy should
provide definite and un-ambiguous direction and a specific framework for action to
the national designated authority (Security Forces) and other departments (Maritime
Administration) that have a role in the overall national maritime security domain.
This maritime security strategy should follow the direction of higher national
maritime security policy and other international considerations associated with the
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UNCLOS provision. The adopted strategy should also consider leveraging the
existing security forces with multi-mission assets and partnering with both public and
private stakeholders. By adopting this strategy, the security forces of a developing
country can maximize their resources and save on the much-needed financial
resources for training and installing other modern security infrastructure.
Maritime Security Strategy should place a premium on identifying and intercepting
threat well before by surveillance, through national inter-agency coordination,
international cooperation and strengthening ship and port security. The strategy
should balance the law enforcement agency responsibilities for securing the seas for
safe maritime transportation and the need to preserve the economic imperative for
the efficient and reliable movement of ships, cargoes, and passengers through their
ports. The strategy should focus on detection, prevention, protection and deterrence
as well as response or consequence management. It should provide direction and a
framework for action to the all departments and agencies involved in providing
maritime security. Another step to the strategic plan could be operational plan or
contingency plans, which will state how the security force or the appropriate
department will respond to a maritime threat or incident.
6.2.3 Operational plans
Operational response consists primarily of law enforcement measures to identify,
anticipate and prevent threats as well as measures to apprehend the perpetrators. This
plan also should provide measures and back-up resources for restoring essential
government service and emergency relief services and also detailing which Agencies
are responsible towards it. Hence, the maritime security strategy direction should
flow from the positions as indicated in the figure 3 below
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Figure 3 : Flow of Security Policies
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As indicated in the above figure, the operational plans should consider having two
elements of response measures one for dealing with terrorism and another for dealing
with all other types of maritime offences ranging from small mugging to hijacking
situation. Under counter-terrorism plans, there are two elements, one is offensive
strategy involving political, diplomatic and military measures and the other element
is the defensive strategy, involving preventive and response measures as elucidated
in the ISPS Code provisions and various IMO recommendations. The operational
plans for piracy and maritime violence should consider primarily the national
provisions for piracy and other offences and it is advisable to follow the general
guidelines provided by IMO. It should also provide scope for regional cooperative
measures and strict enforcement measures involving the intelligence and police
organization to track the pirate base and apprehending them well before
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contemplating attack as the chances of apprehending pirates during the course of
their act is minimal and extremely risky in its scope and intent.
Coming back to the basic requirement of the IMO security conventions, regarding
preventive and protective measures. We have seen that the preventive measures are
already in place through ISPS Code and regional measures, and what is required is
effective continuation and prolongations of those measures and close monitoring as
required. But for the protective measures, regarding the early warning of the
impending security situation and the ability to respond, it is imperative that the
protective measures are clearly identified and included in the security strategy
document and also in the operational plans. Once the overall operational plans are
developed, it should include contain four basic elements of the protective measures
of Adequate Warning, Awareness and Planning, Timely Reaction and Preparedness
and Action as indicated in the figure 4 below.
Figure 4: Elements of Maritime Security Protective Measures

MARITIME SECURITY
Adequate Warning

Timely Reaction

Awareness, Planning

Preparedness, Action

Due to paucity of time and taking into consideration the extremely broad scope of the
four elements of maritime security protective measures, each meriting individual
attention is far beyond the scope of this study. These four elements are basically
determined by the security infrastructure like operational centers, effective
communication facilities, rapid action resources like fast boats, and attack crafts and
helicopter insertions, training of personnel, interaction with other agencies providing
intelligence and operational readiness of the force. Most of the factors affecting those
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elements are addressed through national organizations and private maritime security
providers. But there are many developing countries, which are not in a position to put
in place the resources for the four basic elements. The development of operational
plans or contingency plans will at least help identify what are the resources required,
which they are lacking.
Once the basic resource requirement are identified, it is suggested that it should be
pursued vigorously through IMO Technical Cooperation measures, regional security
cooperative measures or through the other developed country international assistance
program. Maritime security response plans are more effective when they are adopted
universally. Without effective and meaningful cooperation, individual economies
face higher economic costs and it is in the interest of the developing economies to
ensure that there is a practical and designated framework with requisite authority and
resources in place for facilitating greater cooperation.

6.3

Role of IMO for international coordination

The International Maritime Organization is the only international agency responsible
for coordinating actions, involving seaborne commerce, on a worldwide basis.
Beyond any state’s territorial sea, the IMO provides the means for an effective global
implementation strategy. But the basic division of responsibilities are very clear in
all IMO resolutions that industry takes preventive measures and if a reaction is
required then it should be the responsibility of governments acting both the national
and international levels.
As IMO does not have any oversight role for checking the implementation level of
the protective measures for maritime security, it can however, proactively participate
in coordinating in establishing a global maritime security system.
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6.3.1 Coordinating Information Exchange: The equipment carriage requirement of
the maritime industry in the post ‘9/11’ period has increased tremendously namely
AIS and SSAS. These equipment are going to transmit data which needs to be
monitored closely with regard to security and these functions vary from area to area
depending upon the priority and the importance attached to it. Just like in the case of
Search and Rescue Alert System prevalent today, wherein, there are still many
coastal states which do not have even the basic alert receiving system and they need
to be provided with communication assistance from other RCCs present nearby or
elsewhere, it is feared that a same or similar situation is going to be repeated for
SSAS alerts. Also taking into account the prevailing situation whereby some
contracting states has designated RCCs for receiving SSAS alerts and in some other
cases the maritime administration offices (as observed in chapter 4) are designated as
the alert receiving centres. The importance of reacting to SSAS alerts will get diluted
when the information gets passed around and in some cases the first RCC or the
Operational Centre receiving the SSAS will have no alternative but to inform IMO or
IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre. The ships are entirely dependent on the companies
to provide them security information and the companies are entirely dependent upon
private security agencies to supply them information. Establishment of an
international maritime security information exchange through a international body
and dissemination of information to the concerned agencies though electronic media
will provide much needed succour to the developing countries which do not have the
requisite capability nor the resources to gather or receive intelligence or security
information.
6.3.2 Requirement of international framework for cooperation in maritime
security:
Another area where attention is critically required is in the coordination of
international cooperation for maritime security. The situational demands in the late
eighties called for the adoption International convention for Oil pollution
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC) in the 1990, even though there
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were many international conventions, which were in force addressing the preventive
measures and compensatory issues with regard to oil pollution. This convention
assisted the developing countries firstly to bring about awareness of the effects of the
oil pollution and consequent environmental damage and helped them to adopt certain
measures like establishing national response system, developing contingency plans,
emergency plans for ships, stockpiling pollution response equipment, creation of
reception facilities and developing international and regional cooperation. This one
convention single handedly brought about global uniformity in establishing oil
pollution response measures, even though there was MARPOL and other
conventions relating to oil pollution preventive measures. In view of the foregoing
and taking into consideration the positive and unifying effect and impact of
coordinated action it is felt that the IMO should not wait any further for any major
security incident to occur and should step forward to adopt an international
convention for Maritime Security Preparedness, Response and Cooperation
(MSPRC). It is felt that the convention should be evolved and defined along the
lines of the OPRC 90, incorporating provisions and mandates such as establishment
of national system for maritime security for taking preventive and protective
measures, nomination of central maritime security coordinating authority,
establishment of resources for immediate response, national point of contact for
reporting incidents, development of maritime security contingency plan, both at
national and regional level, protective measures for ports and ships, responsibilities
for governments for action on receiving an SSAS alerts, promotion of bilateral and
multilateral cooperation in preparedness and response, technical cooperation and
institutional arrangements.
Certain provisions have already been addressed, like ship security plan and port
security plans that are akin to contingency plans, which are addressed under the aegis
of the ISPS Code. Also there are existing international cooperation for security issues
especially for developing nations like that of ROCRAM for South America, MOWCA for
West and Central Africa, ASEAN Regional Forum for South and South East Asia region.
Development of regional agreements for addressing maritime security issues is vital for
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sharing of intelligence, training issues and operational commitments in the perceived risk
area as global agreements tend to stagnate due to bigger infrastructure needs and
coordination

Under this convention the cloud which is obscuring the clarity of the intents and
purposes of the IMO regarding the aspect of maritime security can be cleared by
integrating all maritime security convention to address the maritime security issues
under one umbrella and also will act as a medium or vehicle to strengthen the
national commitment of the developing countries and also help in unifying the
actions worldwide as illustrated in the figure 5.
Figure 5: Framework Convention for International Maritime Security
Cooperation.
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In conclusion, the security enforcement strategy depends primarily on the
states legal system, the political processes, dependence on seas and maritime
transport, the threats and vulnerability and its endeavor to adopt the maritime
security system as enumerated in the preceding paragraphs. The uniform application
of contingency measures for providing preventive and protective measures through a
global convention will ensure that the help will come to a requesting vessel or vital
information will be provided to a threatened port or to a coastal state through
institutional measures. Towards fruition of this goal, the IMO and can play a very
vital role.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1

Conclusion

Having taken a detailed look at the security threats and its effects both on the
industry and the economies, it was observed that the maritime security threat is real
and imminent and it is here to stay. Recognising the calamitous extent and scope of
the impact, IMO has taken substantial steps periodically and adopted conventions
and provided many detailed guidelines with respect to the issues of maritime
security. Those guidelines were implementable only to the extent the where national
legal instruments and structures incorporated those provisions and allowed them to
establish jurisdiction and control over the security incidents. The analysis of the legal
regimes of the developing countries as an integral part of this study also provided an
intimate insight into the prevailing maritime security laws, existing more like a
patchwork quilt and their sufficiency to address the current trend of maritime
violence. The adequacy of security system practised by the developing nations
provided information of varying degrees of implementation level and their level of
preparedness.
It also provided information on the adhoc nature of the measures being practised to
address the security issues and non-integration of agencies and lack of coordination
and in most areas, the complete absence of maritime security policy. The impact of
unilateral measures being practised by the US in particular on the global maritime
security regime has been discussed and it was observed that the ISPS Code forms
only a small part of that regime. It is also observed that the developing countries are
proceeding alone in their quest to address the security issues through bilateral and
multilateral treaty with some targeted countries like that of the Proliferation Security
Initiative and Container Security Initiative, etc. The importance of the role played by
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the private security providers was also analysed and has provided insight into the
grasp of the entrepreneurs in the maritime security arena providing technological
solutions to consultancy services to shipping companies and port authorities.
These are found to be general procedural issues and the industry is apprehensive that
the ISPS Code should not turn out to be a administrative monster. Meanwhile, it was
also observed that the maritime security forces are reacting in standalone mode, and
await instructions for response through various higher channels and do their own
intelligence gathering and prepare themselves to react to the security incident. The
basic questions identified are - can the civil maritime administration manage the
security issues on their own and how to marry the civil maritime security procedures
with the law enforcement maritime security procedures and bring about uniform
maritime security strategy to effectively address all maritime security issues.
Chapter six present the importance of maritime security strategy for providing
preventive and protective security to the passengers, ships, crews and ports and to the
vulnerable areas. It was found as a matter-of-fact that the course usually adopted for
the development and implementation of national maritime security strategy is drawn
from the higher national security policy imperatives. The importance of establishing
maritime security operational and contingency plans were studied and it revealed that
coordination between national agencies and prioritising of the responsibilities would
enable all the security requirements under the international conventions and national
legislation could be met adequately and effectively.
The examination of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 provisions and ISPS Code regarding the
communication of security information revealed the woeful absence of institutional
framework for collection and dissemination of information and international
cooperation. Finally, it is found that the industry has prepared itself for the security
requirements and the action by national government for providing preventive and
protective maritime security needed a coordinated approach and establishing or
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reorienting an existing organisation capable of addressing all the security needs.
Most developing countries look for directions in the sense either to find out as to
whether any other developing country has implemented those actions and how did
they manage to do it, or to find whether it is coming from a superior organisation
responsible for global governance of maritime security. Can IMO step forward and
address this burning but silent issue?
Maritime Security Governance: There is no doubt, that the impacts of maritime
violence and terrorist attacks are appreciated as well as their influence on trade and
maritime industry by all the member states. The question that is on everybody’s mind
is whether the solution to maritime terrorism can be addressed adequately and
measures undertaken to tackle this growing menace by the IMO as the global
maritime forum under the new concept of UN’s Global Governance? The ideal IMO
response will involve numerous tasks involving decisions on long-term strategic
goals, agreement among the nations, tactical solutions that involve identifying the
correct and appropriate responses within the parameters of the international law and
avoiding unnecessary or excessive trade security barriers.
Globalisation poses many challenges to the world communities and to the
functioning of the national governments as true representatives of these global
interests. As globalization changes, shipping changes and becomes even more
internationalised than it was before. An example of this change is the extensive use
of forum shopping of registries by the ship owners. All these challenges of change in
structures have been taken advantage of the perpetrators of maritime crimes with the
element of uncertainty.
The global governance may provide some answer to the problem and IMO is the
only international organization dealing with maritime issues and it is the only
agency, which has the mandate for the global governance through their complete
grasp of the issues affecting shipping and maritime security. The problem here is
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finding the answer to the question - Does IMO has complete grasp of all matters
affecting the global shipping and maritime industry?
The governance of response to the emerging security scenario involves issues of the
governance of the maritime sector within international governance regimes.
Governance is crucial in the situation of maritime terrorism and is the commencing
point of physical protection measures and response actions and therefore a threat to
governance ranks highest in risk and priority (Salonio, 2002). The question here is
what is governance and how to bring about the governance in the maritime sphere.
The concept of global governance as expressed by the United Nations Commission
on Global Governance (UNCGG) Report, 1995 as the “sum of the many ways
individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs”.
Say for example, the global governance on maritime security is the sum of many
ways the industry, the national governments, the shipping companies and ports and
others affected by the maritime security has implemented the ISPS Code and other
security convention provisions. Interestingly enough, we may find that many have
implemented fully and some have just started and few have not implemented the
requirements of the ISP Code at all. It is clear that the global governance of security
is the sum total of implementation level and their maintenance status. The failures at
the governance level will lead to problems like, not being able to respond to
situations in time, acceptance of piecemeal solutions, reliance on local efforts which
may be excessive and not conforming to global policy and several other problems
leading to unwanted management problems.

Therefore, the threat to maritime

governance put simply, means the threat of not being able to deal with the problem.
This weakness is to be eliminated at all cost and should not reside in regional pockets
around the developing states. IMO should establish maritime governance concepts
for the member states, apart from developing and adopting conventions and through
international organizations and NGOs can integrate them to the IMO’s integrated
policy on maritime security.

112

Therefore IMO requires an umbrella policy for the maritime governance of maritime
security networked with all other conventions of maritime security and interlinked
with the UN security council policies in order to assist national governments to frame
their national policies in a uniform and harmonized manner. Once this framework is
kept in place, IMO is to develop Maritime security Preparedness, Response and
Cooperation Convention along the lines of the International Convention on Oil
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 1990 as recommended in Chapter
6 and pave the way forward for the developing countries to meet all the security
needs.
7.2

Recommendations

In the developing countries, the implementation of the IMO requirements should
form part of their national maritime security policy and towards this end, the
developing country, if not already done, should wholeheartedly attempt to
completely revamp their policies in a time bound manner so as to integrate them and
make them in tune with the new era of globalisation and terrorism. First step towards
this reform is a sound national legislation, preferably one consolidated legislation
addressing all issues of maritime security. Further, those states should take steps to
focus the vision, intent and purposes and integrate the agencies, organisation and
departments concerned to collectively address the security issues through national
maritime security strategic plans. They should also designate an appropriate authority
having a armed force and law enforcement capability to take control of the maritime
security issues and implement the international security requirements, under the
existing maritime security regime and the various international and regional
initiatives to provide a comprehensive protective security regime for their ships and
ports. The administrative issues of preventive security as required by Part A of the
ISPS Code can reside with the existing set up of the maritime administration if they
are civilian based. However, certain elements of ISPS Code control provisions like
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extended investigation, boarding of ship and responding to security incidents should
be integrated with the professional security authority having armed forces structure.
This would bring about some accountability and all the security incidents whether it
is small scale armed robbery or a higher end hijacking of chemical tanker and using
it as weapon or any other form of threats would be dealt by a professional security
organisation.
The law enforcement agency or the armed forces do regularly exercise their
resources and inclusion of merchant ships security in their portfolio will bring about
a overall security consciousness. Here the commercial interests may get affected. But
regular meeting and discussions among the interested organisations will help weed
out the shortcoming and practising security will become a second nature in the long
run. The states should be proactive in participating in regional agreements for
coordination of maritime security in their respective regions and develop security
infrastructure accordingly. These agreements should not deviate from the general
guiding principles covering the maritime security adopted by IMO.
IMO has a vital role to play in the uniform application of its conventions and Global
Governance is the foundation for the successful response to security incidents. The
IMO should step forward and implement an umbrella convention for maritime
security preparedness, Response and cooperation and coordinate the implementation
through technical cooperation programme and provide financial assistance through
the International Maritime Security Fund and other international efforts. Towards
this end, half of the groundwork has been already done through ISPS Code for
vulnerability assessments and putting into place some preventive measures. What it
needs to do is to closely observe and depute or nominate professional team to
establish national maritime security system and provide necessary infrastructure to
the developing countries. The maritime training provided at WMU has to incorporate
maritime security as main subjects and also provide capsule course to maritime
security forces as and when required. Maritime universities and other maritime
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training centres should have maritime security as one of the mandatory subjects for
qualification.
Failure to act and coordinate global governance by the IMO will enable the
developed countries to take the mantle and implement the unilateral security
initiative and use the carrot and stick method for ensuring implementation of their
own security strategy. Such an arbitrary approach would prove very costly and IMO
will lose its credibility and standing as a true representative organization for
protecting the interests of the global maritime community and will lead to chaos and
the mushrooming of fragmented security regimes and this is the last thing which
should happen in a uncertain world.
Meanwhile, the developed countries, whose security measures are accepted as a
strategy for responding to the future security incidents, should know that the element
of surprise for creating a catastrophic incident is always omnipresent and no amount
of money or technology can deter a determined terrorist to carry out the attack as the
recent incidents worldwide indicate. Alternatively there are avenues available to the
developed countries especially, the US which should take a serious look to
implement programmes for addressing the socio-economic and other welfare issues
of the nations, wherein, its nationals has potential to transgress the normal order and
involve in maritime crimes. The example of such programme is the Marshall Plan,
wherein General George C. Marshall who was in charge helping with the
reconstruction of Europe post world war II, stated that there could be “no political
stability and no assured peace" without economic security, and that U.S. policy was
“directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty,
desperation, and chaos”. As Marshall's words so plainly suggest, finding the
terrorists should be part of a much more ambitious campaign, one in which the rich
countries approach the appalling inequities of the world with the same boldness and
determination that the United States brought to bear in Europe under the Marshall
Plan.
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Globalization has raised expectation levels, even as modern communications make
the rising inequality between a rich, powerful, and imposing west and the rest of the
world visible to all. Poverty and deprivation do not automatically translate into
hatred. But people whose hopes have worn thin, whose aspirations have been
thwarted, and whose discontent is rising, are far more likely to succumb to the siren
song of extremism. This is particularly true for the swelling ranks of young people
whose prospects for the future are bleak.
The United States and the other industrial nations should launch a global "Marshall
Plan" which would have at its core the laudable aim to provide everyone on earth
with a decent standard of living. A good beginning to this effort is the meeting of the
representatives of economics, politics, science, media and non-governmental
organizations around the world and across all party lines in 2003 to launch the
Global Marshall Plan Initiative. The group included representatives from the Club of
Rome, the Eco-Social Forum, UN Organizations, the European Parliament, and
many other national parliaments. Under this plan, the goal was to establish a
worldwide economic, political and civil system for a new era of cooperation, which
will achieve global security, peace and prosperity for everyone. The support of the
United Nations and international organizations such as the WTO, IMF and ILO are
sought for the realisation of the objectives of the Global Marshall Plan.
Meanwhile we do not live in a perfect world. There is a clear and present danger to
marine transportation system and the maritime threats are real and it is serious. There
has been an awakening within the international maritime community that the acts of
terrorism and other forms of violence could cause politico-socio-economic destabilisation of tremendous proportions and that its effects could reverberate far
beyond the point of occurrence. In the age of globalisation the market forces will
determine where the ship sails and which port it will enter. It is of vital interest to the
developing nations to manage their security issues so as to compete as equals in the
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global market and the national maritime security strategy will provide some basic
security foundation upon which different layers can be built up depending upon the
threat level and capability.

Safety and security are the fundamental priority for

maritime transport and can be achieved by comprehensive and integrated action.
Preventing maritime crime and terrorism on the seas should not be an unreachable
possibility, but a reality!
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Appendix
QUESTIONAIRE SENT TO MARITIME ADMINISTRATION AND
SHIIPING COMPANIES FOR ASSISTING THE DISSERTATION
Questionnaire - General

1. What is the level of risk and maritime threats that your country /company’s
shipping environment is now facing or is likely to face in the future?
(Company maritime risk assessment - against piracy, maritime violence,
terrorism or other threats to ships and ports) (Please check the boxes)
Very high

High

Moderate

Low

None

2. Has your country /company made/received National Legislation(s) or
Regulation(s) on IMOs SUA 1988 Convention and its Protocol and to the
SOLAS Chapter XI- 2 provisions relating to ISPS Code?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
3. Has your administration /company faced any difficulties in the past with
complying with National Laws and Rules in enforcing the provisions of SUA
1988 and ISPS Code? If, yes, could you provide some details.
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
4. Have you created a separate Department within your organisation to deal with
security related issues for implementing National Regulations on SUA 88
Convention and ISPS Code provisions. If so, could you provide the relevant
details?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
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5. Do you find the law enforcement personnel in your country are trained and
structured adequately to coordinate the implementation of IMO Security
Conventions and adequately equipped and empowered to assist the shipping
operations?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
6. What kind of assistance do you expect from the Government and the
International Shipping Community to address any of the constraints
encountered regarding the implementation of preventive measures related to
maritime security.
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
7. Would you like to offer any suggestions / comments on the issue of maritime
security?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
Part B - The IMO Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988
1. Which is the lead agency in your country nominated to coordinate SUA
related security measures.
______________________________________________________________
____________
2. Has the National Legislation been drafted in such a way so as to instruct your
company regarding security measures that needs to be instituted to prevent
Article 3 of SUA 88 offences taking place
______________________________________________________________
____________
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3. Are there provisions established in the Administration /Company’s Rules &
Regulations related to SUA 88 Convention to instruct the Master of the Ship
regarding his role after identifying and apprehending an offender onboard
your ship as enumerated in Article 8. If so, could you furnish the relevant
details?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
4. Has your Company’s Security Officer been trained for SUA related security
issues? If not, what assistance do you expect from the Industry and the
Maritime Administration.
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
5. Does your administration /company feel that the SUA 88 Convention is
adequate enough to cover all the maritime threats, if not please specify the
lacunae?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
Part C – Chapter XI-2 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea, 1974 and International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code
1. Has your Country enacted Legislation or amended any Act to incorporate
Chapter XI-2 provisions of the SOLAS 74. I so, could you furnish the
relevant particulars?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
2. Which is the Designated Authority or Organisation in your Country
designated to coordinate the implementation of the ISPS Code
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______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
___________________________________
3. Has your country drafted any Rules, Regulations or Guidelines for
implementing the provisions of the ISPS Code regarding setting of security
levels, declaration of Security (DoS) etc.?, If yes, could you provide the
necessary details?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
4. Has the Maritime Administration of your country possess the capability for
approving and certifying the Ship Security Plans for your ships. If not which
Agency or Agencies has been nominated as Recognised Security
Organisation.
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
5. Are there any ports, which your ship regularly visits, which do not require
ISPS compliance and how do you intend to address the security issues?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
6. What extent of the Part B provisions of the ISPS code has been made
mandatory in your company’s Rules & Regulations?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
7. How do you intend to obtain information regarding the security threats and
what are the mechanisms adopted to convey such information to your
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registered ships for setting security level. Is there any proposal to obtain
commercially available information?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
8. Does your administration /company coordinate with your Rescue
Coordination Centres (RCC) to sent and receive ship security alerts and AIS
information? Which is the agency nominated to respond to ship security
alerts. What measures are available to react to such alert?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
9. I your opinion, do you think that the compliance with ISPS Code has
burdened the safe operation of ships and is there any intention to increase the
manning level in your ships?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
10. Does the implementation of the ISPS code in your country/company
sufficiently address the existing maritime threats, if not, could you kindly
state the reasons?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
11. What sort of assistance does your Company seek from the Maritime
Administration of your country or any other International Organisation for
enabling you to fully comply with the provisions of the ISPS Code?
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
____________________________________
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